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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In M a r c h  1971, Marshall Armstrong, then President of the American In­
stitute of Certified Public Accountants ( “AICPA” or “the Institute”), act­
ing at the direction of the Board of Directors of the Institute, appointed a 
seven-man group to study the establishment of accounting principles and 
to make recommendations for improving that process.
This Report is the product of that assignment. Its conclusions represent 
the unanimous judgment of the members of the study group.
The decision was made to include in the study group significant repre­
sentation from outside the practice of public accounting. Consistent with 
this determination, the following persons (a majority of whom are neither 
practicing certified public accountants nor members of the Institute) were 
appointed to the study group (the “Study”) :
Jo h n  C. B ie g l e r , CPA, senior partner of Price Waterhouse & Co.
A r n o l d  I. L e v in e , CPA, national executive partner, management of J. K. 
Lasser & Company.
W a lla c e  E. O l s o n , CPA, executive partner, Alexander Grant & Com­
pany.
T h o m a s  C. P r yo r , senior vice-president and chairman of the investment 
policy committee of White Weld & Co., investment bankers.
R oger  B . S m it h , vice-president—finance, General Motors Corporation.
D avid  So l o m o n s , FCA, professor and chairman of the accounting de­
partment, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
F r a n c is  M . W h e a t —chairman, partner of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 
attorneys-at-law; commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
1964-1969.
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The prospectus for the Study is contained in Appendix A, pages 8 7-88 , 
to this Report. The Study was asked to “examine the organization and oper­
ation of the Accounting Principles Board and determine what changes are 
necessary to attain better results faster.” In so doing, it was expected that 
the Study would consider criticisms of the Institute’s existing efforts to 
establish accounting principles. However, it was not intended that the 
Study should confine itself to the role of the Institute in the standard-setting 
process. The terms of the Study’s prospectus indicated that “entirely new 
approaches” should also be considered. The scope of the Study’s work 
has been consistent with this broad directive.
It was not within the Study’s province to undertake a critical evaluation 
of the published opinions of the Accounting Principles Board of the Institute 
(the “APB” or “Board”). The Study was not expected to become involved 
with technical questions of accounting theory or practice. On the contrary, 
we were primarily concerned with the processes and means by which ac­
counting principles should be established. A separate study group (the 
“Accounting Objectives Study Group”), also organized in the spring of 
1971, is presently reviewing the objectives of financial statements and the 
technical problems in achieving those objectives. The task assigned to 
this companion study, chaired by Robert M. Trueblood, is broader than 
ours. It was expected from the outset that our study would be the first to 
be completed.
We wish to acknowledge with appreciation the assistance we received 
from numerous groups and individuals concerned with improvement in the 
process of establishing accounting principles. Many of those with whom 
we met arranged to do so at substantial personal inconvenience. Many 
briefs and other communications of the highest quality, reflecting a major 
effort on the part of their authors, were submitted to us and are a part of 
our public files. The fact that so many undertook to help us in these ways 
attests to the depth of interest in this country in improving financial ac­
counting. As Leonard M. Savoie, Executive Vice-President of the Institute, 
said last October: “Never before has there been such a craving for credi­
bility of information given to the public.”
Set forth in Appendix B, pages 89-91 , to this Report are the names of 
representative organizations which provided the Study with invaluable help. 
The individuals who contributed to the work of the Study through these 
organizations are too numerous for us to list. However, we do wish to 
acknowledge with special appreciation the contributions made by the per­
sons listed in Appendix B in their individual capacities and not as members 
of a particular firm or organization.
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CHAPTER 2
The work of the Study
Background of the Study
T h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of the decade of the sixties was a period of unprece­
dented stress for the individual members and institutions of the accounting 
profession. Problems arising from the rapid expansion of accounting 
firms, the new issue boom, the development of increasingly complex and 
innovative business practices, and the corporate merger movement com­
bined to create a wave of criticism of corporate financial reporting. This 
criticism came both from within and outside the profession, and much of it 
was focused upon the work of the APB.
Responding to this criticism, the Board of Directors of the Institute in 
January 1971 called a two-day conference of 35 prominent account­
ants representing 21 accounting firms. The purpose of the meeting was to 
consider how the Institute might reappraise its standard-setting role and 
how that role could be made more responsive to the needs of those who 
rely upon financial statements. Reflecting the mood of the conference, 
President Marshall Armstrong observed: “If we are not confronted with 
a crisis of confidence in the profession, we are at least faced with a serious 
challenge to our ability to perform a mission of grave public responsi­
bility.”
The conference recommended that two studies be undertaken under 
the Institute’s sponsorship to explore ways of improving financial report­
ing. Our Study and the Accounting Objectives Study resulted from this 
recommendation.
In a parallel move, the Executive Committee of the American Ac­
counting Association, meeting in February 1971, adopted a report calling
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for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the means of estab­
lishing accounting principles. Upon the announcement of our Study, 
however, the AAA determined to table its own call for action pending 
a review of the results of our work.
During the progress of our Study, interest in the problems that con­
cerned us continued at a high level. Two examples of this interest deserve 
mention. In October 1971 a two-day conference on “Institutional Issues 
in Formulating Reporting Standards” was held under the auspices of the 
Graduate School of Management of Northwestern University. Three 
members of the Study attended this conference. At the annual meeting 
of the Financial Executives Institute in October 1971, attended by one 
member of the Study, a full session was devoted to the resolution of con­
troversy over accounting principles. Among the principal speakers at this 
session was Commissioner James J. Needham of the Securities and Ex­
change Commission.
The many suggestions advanced by critics of the existing state of affairs 
have been reviewed with great care by the Study. These suggestions have 
varied widely, as might be expected, in light of the marked differences in 
vantage point and interest of their proponents. On one point, however, 
all were in agreement. The task of improving financial accounting stand­
ards is urgent in a free enterprise economy such as ours. As the number 
of people (presently over 30 million) owning stock in publicly held busi­
nesses continues to grow, that urgency increases. The task force has by no 
means been neglected. A dedicated effort has been made by the account­
ing profession to shoulder its burdens. But the times call for even greater 
dedication and effort. Failing this, the present system for allocation of 
capital in our free society could be placed in grave jeopardy.
Procedures followed by the Study
Ours has been an independent study in every sense. The thinking of 
each of us went through a process of evolution during the course of our 
work. Our conclusions were reached only after rigorous analysis and 
debate among ourselves. At no time prior to the completion of this Report 
were these conclusions discussed with any member of the Board of Di­
rectors of the Institute or with the Institute’s staff.
Since our first meeting in New York on May 14, 1971, we have met 
as a group on eight separate occasions for a total of 14 days. In addition, 
two days were devoted to a public hearing held in New York, the notice
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of which is included as Appendix C, pages 93-96 . At this hearing, which 
received wide publicity, the Study heard oral statements from 17 individ­
uals and groups drawn from the public accounting profession, profes­
sional organizations, trade associations, universities, and others, all but one 
of which submitted written statements to us. Twenty-three other position 
papers were submitted to us and reviewed in connection with the hearing.
In addition to meetings of the full Study, subcommittees of the study 
group spent many days meeting separately with various individuals and 
groups. On two occasions the Study met with the SEC and its staff. We 
 cannot, of course, guarantee that everyone with a contribution to make 
has been heard, but whatever shortcomings may attend the results of our 
labors, they cannot be attributed to a paucity of advice.
Members of the Study also attended various meetings and public hear­
ings held by the Accounting Principles Board. A great number of pub­
lished statements concerning the matters before us have been reviewed. 
Background studies have been prepared for us by our Administrative 
Secretary and by other persons. Some of this material will be referred to 
specifically below.
The Study’s public record
It was determined that the Study’s proceedings, insofar as practicable, 
should constitute a public record available to anyone interested in the 
data considered by the Study and the submissions made to it.
Accordingly, a depository of documents available for public inspection 
has been established at the offices of the AICPA, 666 Fifth Avenue, New 
York, New York, comprising the following materials pertinent to the Study:
1. A full transcript of the oral proceedings at the public hearing held by 
the Study on November 3 and 4, 1971. 
2. Copies of all written submissions made to the Study in response to the 
notice of the public hearing.
3. Copies of over 100 additional reports, articles, pamphlets, books, and 
papers collected for and reviewed by members of the Study during the 
course of its deliberations.
Copies of any of the foregoing are available for examination on request. 
In addition, the full transcript of the Study’s public hearing may be pur­
chased from the Institute.
5
CHAPTER 3
Summary of conclusions 
and recommendations
T h e  s c o p e  and nature of the task of establishing accounting principles 
must be considered before proposals for improvement can be made. Ac­
cordingly, our Report begins by discussing what is meant by “establishing 
accounting principles.” We trace the effort to formulate a body of funda­
mental accounting concepts, an effort which went forward concurrently 
with the setting of more detailed standards to deal with specific problems 
of financial accounting and reporting. This historical review shows that 
while the APB and its predecessor, the AICPA’s Committee on Accounting 
Procedure, have done much to raise the level of financial reporting, many 
of their opinions have had little to do with “principles” as that word is 
normally understood. We therefore recommend (in Chapter 4 ) the use in 
the future of the term “financial accounting standards” as better describing 
the nature of the Board’s pronouncements.
In Chapter 5, we consider a threshhold question: Should financial ac­
counting standards be formulated by a governmental or a private body? 
We reach the conclusion that this task should continue to be shouldered 
in the private sector, subject to appropriate review by the SEC. The present 
standard-setting arrangements are described in Chapter 6, including the 
relationships of the APB with the SEC and other governmental agencies. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these arrangements and a number of 
possible alternatives are considered in Chapter 7.
The Study concluded, after listening to much evidence and weighing 
many conflicting points of view, that while the procedures devised at the 
end of the 1950s for formulating financial accounting standards were prob-
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ably appropriate at that time and have brought about notable improvements 
in financial reporting during the APB’s 12-year history, the time has come 
for a change.
The APB, which has a present membership of 18, was set up in 1959 as 
a senior committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Account­
ants. As such, it is the voice of the Institute on financial reporting stan­
dards. Nonmembers of the Institute may not serve on it. Board members 
continue their affiliations with their firms, companies, or institutions while 
serving without compensation on the Board. Under these arrangements, 
the accounting profession, in the fullest sense, is performing the self-regu­
latory function of establishing standards for the guidance of its members 
in attesting to the fairness of financial statements.
This fact has been an important source of strength for the APB. It has 
helped to assure acceptance of APB pronouncements. But we cannot ignore 
the difficulties which have arisen under the present arrangements. In sum­
mary, we see these arrangements as falling short of what is needed today 
in the following respects:
1. A part-time, volunteer APB will continue to be subject to doubts as to 
the disinterestedness of its members— their freedom from client and 
other pressures.
2. A part-time APB, however dedicated, cannot devote itself continu­
ously and single-mindedly to the urgent problems confronting it.
3. Formulation of financial accounting standards would benefit from a 
broader base and perhaps a greater variety of skills than can be sup­
plied by a group chosen from among the members of a single profes­
sional organization, all of whom must hold the CPA certificate.
4. The research activities of the APB need more substantial and continu­
ous direction than a part-time Board can provide.
We believe these imperfections call for more than minor modification of 
the present arrangements. A summary of our proposals (which appear in 
more detail in Chapter 8) follows:
First, we propose that a new foundation, to be called the Financial Ac­
counting Foundation, be established, separate from all existing professional 
bodies. It would have nine trustees whose principal duties would be to 
appoint the members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and to 
raise the funds for its operation. One of the trustees would be the Presi­
dent of the AICPA. The other eight would be appointed by the Board of 
Directors of the Institute for three-year terms (after initially staggered terms
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to assure continuity). Four appointed trustees would be CPAs in public 
practice. Two trustees would be financial executives, one a financial ana­
lyst, and one an accounting educator. These four trustees would be chosen, 
respectively, from names submitted by each of the following organizations: 
the Financial Executives Institute, the National Association of Accountants, 
the Financial Analysts Federation, and the American Accounting Associa­
tion. The trustees would select their own chairman. The trustees would 
be responsible for appointing the members of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (described below) and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Advisory Council (also described below), for raising and allocating the 
funds required for the new structure, and for periodically reviewing that 
structure. Their actions would require a two-thirds majority of their total 
number, except when making structural changes in their own organization 
or that of the Standards Board or Advisory Council, when eight affirmative 
votes would be necessary.
Secondly, we propose that a Financial Accounting Standards Board be 
established with seven members, all salaried and serving full-time for terms 
of five years with a possible renewal for a second term. They would be 
appointed by the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which would also 
designate one of them to serve at its pleasure as chairman. The members 
of the Standards Board would, during their terms of office, have no other 
business affiliations. Four of the Standards Board members would be CPAs 
drawn from public practice. The other three should have extensive experi­
ence in the financial reporting field but need not hold a CPA certificate. 
The affirmative vote of five of the seven members of the Standards Board 
would be required to approve a standard before it could be issued. Inter­
pretations of standards, when deemed necessary, would be issued with the 
full authority of the new Board. The new Board would, to the fullest extent 
possible, carry out its functions in public. A history for each pronounce­
ment should be developed and made publicly available. As regards the 
transition from the APB to the Standards Board, we propose that opinions 
which have reached the exposure draft stage should be carried through to 
completion by the APB. Other matters on the APB’s agenda should be 
transferred to the Standards Board. There will doubtless also be some 
carryover of committee and staff personnel to ease the transition.
Thirdly, we propose that the Board of Trustees of the Foundation estab­
lish a Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council with approximately 
20 members to work closely with the Standards Board in an advisory 
capacity. Members of the Advisory Council would be appointed by the 
trustees to serve one-year terms which could be renewed indefinitely. They
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would be entitled to reimbursement for expenses but no remuneration. 
They would be drawn from a variety of occupations, although not more 
than one-quarter of the membership should come from any single sphere of 
activity. The chairman of the Standards Board would be, ex officio, chair­
man of the Advisory Council. The Advisory Council would consult with 
the Standards Board as to its priorities, help it to set up task forces which 
would aid the Board in detailed investigation of issues under consideration, 
react to proposed standards, and otherwise assist the Standards Board when 
called upon to do so.
Finally, we recommend that research projects be more carefully defined 
and more rigorously controlled than in the past to ensure that they are 
directly germane to the Board’s needs and are carried out expeditiously. As 
far as possible, research studies carried out for the Standards Board should 
be worked on full-time, whether the researcher is a paid consultant or a 
member of the Board’s staff.
We estimate that the cost of implementing our proposals will be between 
$2,500,000 and $3,000,000 a year. These figures do not greatly exceed 
the present cost of operating the APB when one takes into account the ap­
proximate value of the time given by APB members and their staffs. We 
make no recommendation as to how the necessary funds should be raised, 
preferring to leave to the trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation 
as free a hand as possible. However, four alternative methods of funding 
are considered briefly in our Report. Of these, reliance on the voluntary 
support of firms, individuals, and companies might initially be the most 
practical method, even if another method were to be adopted later.
We believe the arrangements embodied in our proposals are superior to 
the present structure in six important respects:
1. The Standards Board will be, and will be seen to be, free of any private 
interests which might conflict with the public interest.
2. Because of its compactness and because its members will serve full­
time, the Standards Board will be able to devote undivided attention 
to its tasks and to move expeditiously, when necessary, to deal with 
urgent problems.
3. The new organizational structure will facilitate participation by a num­
ber of important groups in the standard-setting task. It will thus have 
a broader base of support, and it will be possible to draw upon a broader
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range of skills both for the Standards Board itself and for its supporting 
organizations.
4. It will be possible to seek broader financial support for the work of the 
new Standards Board.
5. Because of its strong link with the AICPA, the Standards Board should 
continue to command the support of the public accounting profession. 
We consider such support essential to effective enforcement of the 
standards developed by the Board.
6. The new Board will be better able to supervise and monitor the essen­
tial research which should precede much of its work and to see to it 
that such research is performed expeditiously.
It is, of course, a question of judgment whether our proposals will produce 
the desired results. We believe they will, and we commend them not only 
to the Board of Directors of the AICPA (to whom this Report is formally 
addressed) but also to all who think it important to improve financial re­
porting methods and to increase public confidence in financial information 
provided to stockholders and others. As an American Accounting Asso­
ciation report on this subject said last year, “while it is too much to say 
that the survival of the free enterprise system depends on improvements in 
present methods of financial reporting, it is not too much to say that it can 
never reach its full potential without them.” We share that view and hope 
that our recommendations will contribute to that goal.
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CHAPTER 4
What does "the establishment of 
accounting principles" mean?
B e f o r e  a  j u d g m e n t  can be arrived at as to how accounting principles 
should be established, it is necessary to inquire about the scope and nature 
of the task. What does “the establishment of accounting principles” 
mean?
“Accounting principles” has proven to be an extraordinarily elusive 
term. To the nonaccountant (as well as to many accountants) it connotes 
things basic and fundamental, of a sort which can be expressed in few 
words, relatively timeless in nature, and in no way dependent upon chang­
ing fashions in business or the evolving needs of the investment commu­
nity. Yet the APB (despite the prominence in its name of the term 
“principles” ) has deemed it necessary throughout its history to issue opin­
ions on subjects which have almost nothing to do with “principles” in 
the usual sense. For example, Opinion No. 19 ( “Reporting Changes in 
Financial Position” ) deals with a financial statement considered appro­
priate for inclusion when the balance sheet and income statement of a 
business are reported upon; portions of the two Omnibus Opinions (Nos. 
10 and 12) deal purely with matters of disclosure; and Opinion No. 15 
( “Earnings Per Share” ) deals with methods of calculating and presenting 
the net earnings on a per share basis. Projects on the agenda of the APB 
include matters far removed from the domain of “principles,” such as 
the makeup of interim financial statements and the disclosure of account­
ing policies followed in the preparation of financial statements. Other
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examples of the work of the APB could be given for which the term 
“principles” is at best inappropriate, but the point has been sufficiently 
illustrated.
Why has the term “principles” persisted in describing the work of the 
APB? How could the nature of its task be described with greater clarity 
and comprehensiveness?
To answer such questions we must go back to the year 1932 when the 
accounting profession in the United States took a major step toward 
improving standards of financial accounting for publicly held corporate 
enterprises. On September 22 of that year, a date which has been de­
scribed as perhaps the most important in the recent history of accounting, 
a committee of the American Institute of Accountants (the predecessor 
body of the AICPA), headed by the late George O. May, recommended 
to the New York Stock Exchange that audit certificates for listed com ­
panies should state that the financial statements were prepared in accord­
ance with “accepted principles of accounting” and recommended five 
basic principles to be followed in the preparation of such financial state­
ments. 1
Less than two years after the report of the May Committee, Congress 
adopted the first of the Federal Securities Acts, an event which heralded a 
period of great expansion for the accounting profession in America. An 
increased sense of responsibility accompanied this expansion, stimulated 
by the seminal work of May and his colleagues, and manifested by an 
increasing effort to develop professional norms. This effort has followed 
two paths. There has been the attempt to establish a body of fundamental 
accounting concepts, whether by logical deduction from a few basic 
premises or by induction from experience, or both. This attempt faltered 
in the early 1960s. At the same time (and increasingly since the mid- 
1960s) the profession mounted an effort to develop more specific stan­
dards of financial accounting and reporting without reference to any 
systematic theoretical foundation, but with at least three practical goals 
in view: ( 1 )  to discourage practices in specific areas which experience 
indicated might be employed in such a way as to mislead public investors; 
( 2 )  to encourage practices which could be expected to make financial 
statements more informative; and, ( 3 )  to reduce the use of alternative 
accounting methods not justified by factual or circumstantial differences.
1 The history of this event and its aftermath are discussed in Dr. Reed K. Storey’s 
The Search for Accounting Principles (New York: AICPA, 1964).
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The effort to formulate a body 
of fundamental concepts
At the time the APB was first organized, it was widely hoped that 
one of the first results of its labors would be a “grand design” of ac­
counting theory upon which all else would rest. The Charter of the 
Board states that “pronouncements on financial accounting and reporting 
are expected to encompass (a )  fundamentals of financial accounting, 
(b )  definitions of ‘terms of art’ used in financial accounting, (c) applica­
tions of the fundamentals in specific areas of financial accounting, and
(d )  the form and content of financial statements, including the nature 
and extent of appropriate disclosures therein.” Primacy was given to fun­
damentals with applications following along behind. In the 1958 report 
of the AICPA’s Special Committee on Research Program ,2 which con­
tained the blueprint for the APB, the importance of developing the funda­
mentals of accounting was given even greater prominence:
The broad problem of financial accounting should be visualized as re­
quiring attention at four levels: first, postulates; second, principles; third, 
rules or other guides for the application of principles in specific situations; 
and fourth, research.
Postulates are few in number and are the basic assumptions on which 
principles rest. . . . The profession . . . should make clear its understand­
ing and interpretation of what they are, to provide a meaningful founda­
tion for the formulation of principles and the development of rules or 
other guides for the application of principles in specific situations. . . .
A  fairly broad set of co-ordinated accounting principles should be formu­
lated on the basis of the postulates. . . . The principles, together with the 
postulates, should serve as a framework of reference for the solution of 
detailed programs.
Rules or other guides for the application of accounting principles in 
specific situations, then, should be developed in relation to the postulates 
and principles previously expressed. . . .
If these early hopes have not been borne out, it has not been for want 
of trying. Accounting Research Study No. 1, written by Professor Mau­
rice Moonitz in 1961, and Accounting Research Study No. 3, written by 
Professors Robert Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz in 1962, were devoted 
respectively to basic accounting postulates and broad accounting prin­
ciples. Both were disavowed by the APB as “too radically different . . .
2 The Journal of Accountancy (December 1958), pp. 62-68.
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for acceptance at this time” 3 although, in the decade since they were 
published, they have had a considerable effect on accounting thought.
The failure of this first effort to win support did not signal abandonment 
by the APB of the attempt to develop a conceptual foundation for its 
work. Accounting Research Study No. 7, published in 1965 and written 
by Paul Grady, Director of Accounting Research of the AICPA at the 
time his study was being prepared, consisted of a compilation of the “prin­
ciples” which could be deduced from current accounting practice. Because 
accounting practice is not always consistent, the “principles” compiled by 
Grady were not always consistent. His inventory was descriptive, not 
normative. It did not result in a statement by the APB itself.
In the same year, the AICPA’s Special Committee on Opinions of the 
Accounting Principles Board, commonly referred to as the Seidman Com­
mittee, again sought to emphasize the need for a conceptual base for the 
work of the APB:
Nevertheless, it remains true that until the basic concepts and principles 
are formulated and promulgated, there is no official benchmark for the 
premises on which the audit attestation stands. Nor is an enduring base 
provided by which to judge the reasonableness and consistency of treat­
ment of a particular subject. Instead, footing is given to controversy and 
confusion. . . .
What is meant by the expression “generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples”? . . . Where are they inscribed, and by whom?
The Committee’s first recommendation called upon the Board to set 
forth its views on the purpose of financial statements and the attest func­
tion, to enumerate and describe the basic concepts to which accounting 
principles should be oriented, to state the accounting principles to which 
practices and procedures should conform, and to define a number of 
widely used terms.
The Board’s response to this recommendation is embodied in its State­
ment No. 4 ( “Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying 
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises” ), issued in October 1970. 
Like Accounting Research Study No. 7, which preceded it by five years, 
the Statement analyzes current accounting practice but stops short of 
asking how well practice serves the objectives of accounting. To quote
3 Statement N o. 1 o f the Accounting Principles Board (N ew  York: AICPA, April 
1962).
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the Statement itself, it “is primarily descriptive, not prescriptive. It iden­
tifies and organizes ideas that for the most part are already accepted. . . . 
The description of present generally accepted accounting principles is 
based primarily on observation of accounting practice. Present generally 
accepted accounting principles have not been formally derived from the 
environment, objectives, and basic features of financial accounting.”
Unlike Paul Grady’s “Inventory,” which as a research study had only 
the authority of its author’s reputation, Statement No. 4 was a Board 
pronouncement. It did little to appease the Board’s critics; in fact, the 
Board’s present Chairman, Philip L. Defliese, has made it clear that he 
does not regard it as more than an important step along the road. This 
aspect of the Board’s work, which has proven to be so elusive, has now 
passed, for the time being, into other hands with the formation of the 
Accounting Objectives Study Group, the members of which represent a 
broad cross section of the financial community. This group has been 
given the challenging assignment of considering the basic objectives of 
financial statements, the methods or bases of measurement which should 
be used in their preparation, and the forms of presentation which would 
be most useful in achieving those objectives.
The effort to establish more detailed standards of 
financial accounting and reporting
With the passage of the Federal Securities Acts in 1933 and 1934, the 
work of the May Committee was terminated. The Acts gave a government 
agency the power to prescribe the financial reporting practices to be fol­
lowed by a substantial proportion of publicly held businesses. As dis­
cussed in greater detail later in this Report, the SEC requires companies 
subject to its jurisdiction to follow accounting practices certified as gen­
erally accepted by independent public accountants. Only rarely has the 
SEC found it necessary to use its power to prescribe financial accounting 
or reporting practices.
In 1939, the Institute took the initiative in identifying acceptable 
accounting practices by appointing a Committee on Accounting Procedure 
(the “Committee” ).  The Committee adopted a practical problem-by- 
problem approach in identifying generally accepted accounting practices 
to guide those involved in the preparation and certification of financial 
statements.
The Committee was active for 20 years and issued 51 bulletins. 
Throughout its existence, the Committee focused its efforts on identifying
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accepted practices including alternatives. While some questionable prac­
tices were gradually eliminated, the Committee did not make firm choices 
between “acceptable” alternatives, and it did not seek to proscribe widely 
used (hence “accepted” ) methods even though they were in conflict with 
its recommendations. As a result, there continued to exist a superabun­
dance of “acceptable” alternatives for accounting for specific types of 
transactions.
Toward the latter part of the 1950s, the accounting profession was sub­
jected to a barrage of criticism— much of it from within the profession 
itself—for permitting the existence of widely divergent alternative ac­
counting practices, all within the broad framework of “generally accepted 
accounting principles.” It was alleged that financial statements lacked 
comparability as a result of these alternatives, and that investors and other 
users of financial statements were thereby in danger of being misled. The 
response of the profession was to organize the APB to replace the Com­
mittee on Accounting Procedure.
During the early years of the APB, when its efforts in the more theo­
retical sphere were being emphasized, the SEC was encountering increas­
ing practical difficulty with certain financial accounting practices which 
created problems for public investors. Urged by the SEC to confront these 
problems, the APB began in 1964 to issue opinions dealing with particular 
accounting practices considered to be in need of immediate attention. 
Since that time, work along this path has gained in momentum. In 1964 
and 1965 three opinions were issued. In the next three years, six opinions 
were issued. During the three years ended December 31, 1971, the APB 
issued nine opinions. At present, there are fifteen projects on the APB’s 
active agenda, each of which could lead to an opinion.
  It is worth noting that a number of these opinions dealt with matters of 
particular concern to the SEC. Prior to the issuance of Opinion No. 9 
(“Reporting the Results of Operations”) the staff of the SEC had drafted 
the outline of a Commission rule dealing with the presentation of earnings 
per share. This draft was aimed at the elimination of potentially misleading 
“bottom line” calculations not reflective of the potential dilution of per 
share earnings arising from increasingly complex corporate capital struc­
tures. Opinion No. 9 proved in practice to be inadequate as a solution to 
the problem. A new effort was made which resulted in Opinion No. 15.
The SEC was also known to feel an urgent need for an opinion dealing 
with accounting for business combinations. Extraordinary efforts were put 
forth by the APB and its staff to solve this problem— the most difficult, by
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far, in its history— culminating in Opinions Nos. 16 and 17. Recently 
expanded SEC requirements for interim financial reports highlight the need 
for an opinion (presently on the APB’s active agenda) dealing with this 
subject. Action by the SEC in 1969, dealing with “line of business” finan­
cial data in registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, and 
again in 1970, requiring similar data in reports on Form 10-K, has stimu­
lated efforts to develop standards relating to these data (the “diversified 
companies” project on the APB’s agenda). Suggestions made years ago 
by the May Committee regarding disclosure of methods of accounting used 
in particular financial statements lie behind the “accounting policy” item 
on the APB’s agenda.
Thus, in recent years, encouraged by the SEC and by the 1964 special 
action of the governing Council of AICPA (discussed on pages 4 1 -4 2  
below), the APB has actively sought to narrow the areas of difference in 
accounting practice by dealing with pressing issues on a problem-by-prob­
lem basis.
Financial accounting standards
The history of the APB’s efforts, briefly outlined above, provides back­
ground for the Study’s recommendation that the name “Financial Account­
ing Standards Board” be given to the new board proposed in Chapter 8 of 
this Report. In the Study’s judgment, the word “standards” is more de­
scriptive of the majority of the Board’s pronouncements as well as the 
great bulk of its ongoing effort. The term “financial accounting” has be­
come widely accepted as referring to external reporting, as contrasted, for 
example, with management accounting.
The need for a fundamental conceptual foundation has been much de­
bated in accounting circles for many years. We believe this debate may 
have produced more heat than light. Financial accounting and reporting 
are not grounded in natural laws as are the physical sciences, but must rest 
on a set of conventions or standards designed to achieve what are perceived 
to be the desired objectives of financial accounting and reporting. We 
understand the primary work of the Accounting Objectives Study Group to 
be the development of such objectives and some guidelines for their achieve­
ment.
The work of the ongoing standard-setting body should be to develop 
standards for preparing financial accounting information that will be con­
sistent with these objectives. Such standards will, in some cases, be funda­
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mental and cut across all aspects of accounting. In other cases, the stand­
ards will be narrow in their application. What is of greatest importance is 
not whether the standards are fundamental or narrow but whether they 
contribute to progress in achieving the objectives of financial accounting 
and reporting.
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CHAPTER 5
A threshold question: should the 
board be public or private?
O n e  q u e s t io n  overshadows all others when considering the best way to 
set accounting standards. Should the task remain a responsibility of the 
private sector, or should it be taken over by a governmental body? In the 
sphere of government, the choice probably lies between the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or a new body created by Congress for this specific 
purpose. In the private sector, there are several alternatives which we shall 
consider shortly.
Protagonists on both sides can point to examples which could be followed. 
In the public sector, standards for air safety are set by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, for automobile safety by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, for foods and drugs by the Food and Drug Admin­
istration, for atmospheric and water pollution by the Environmental Pro­
tection Agency and by state governments. The setting of standards has not 
been left to the industries concerned or, in the last case, to industry in 
general.
More closely related to our own area of concern is the Cost Accounting 
Standards Board, set up by legislation in 1970 and headed by the Comp­
troller General of the United States. But before too much is made of this 
agency as a possible model, we note that it is concerned with the relatively 
narrow field of setting cost accounting standards for government defense 
procurement contracts, and that the government is itself a major party to 
the transactions which the Cost Accounting Standards Board oversees. It
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should not be surprising, therefore, that standard-setting in this field is not 
left in private hands.
Turning to the private sector, the models of so-called self-regulation 
which come immediately to mind are the stock exchanges and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers in the investment field. Standard-setting in 
other fields is carried out extensively by the American National Standards 
Institute, the Society of Automotive Engineers, the National Fire Protec­
tion Association and many other trade and professional associations.
Those who advocate having the primary standard-setting responsibility 
assumed by a governmental body argue that the public interest at stake in 
establishing accounting standards is too important for this function to be 
left to a nonpublic body not directly responsible to Congress, even though 
subject to SEC oversight. They believe that the protection of investors and 
other users of financial statements requires that standards be set by a body 
that is clearly free of any conflict of interest. They argue that the establish­
ment of accounting standards should involve the cross-disciplinary expertise 
of lawyers, economists, and financial analysts, as well as accountants, and 
they believe that such skills can be best brought to bear on the problems 
by an administrative agency of the Federal Government. Finally, it is 
asserted that accounting standards established by the profession have, as a 
practical matter, the effect of law and should therefore be established by a 
government agency following all of the procedures prescribed for agency 
rule-making.
On the other hand, there are distinct disadvantages to transferring the 
standard-setting function to the public sector. One very real concern is 
that government agencies may be more susceptible to political pressures 
than private bodies. This could lead to accounting standards being designed 
to accomplish the self-serving objectives of private interest groups rather 
than solely to meet the needs of those who use financial statements in mak­
ing economic decisions. The political pressures evident in 1971 when 
Congressional action was taken to regulate the accounting treatment of 
the investment tax credit reinforce this concern.
A second concern is that where government agencies have laid their 
hands on accounting, the result has too often been a tendency toward 
inflexibility and a lack of responsiveness to the needs of investors. The 
failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to take action to modernize 
railroad accounting is hardly a triumph for government regulation. State 
regulation of insurance accounting has not been responsive to the needs of 
shareholders for information relevant to investment decision-making. Other
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examples could, of course, be given. While the SEC’s record in accounting 
matters has been generally well regarded, many believe it has held the clock 
back by consistently opposing the recognition of values as distinct from 
costs in accounting.
A third argument against transferring standard-setting to a government 
agency is the belief that such a development would inevitably sap the vi­
tality of the accounting profession. To an increasing degree, through their 
participation in the work of the APB and in other ways, leaders of the 
profession have given unstintingly of their time and talent in the search 
for better accounting standards. We doubt that such men would be willing 
to contribute to a similar degree if the basic responsibility for accounting 
standards were shifted to government auspices. On the contrary, it seems 
likely that practicing public accountants might be largely reduced to the 
role of advocates on behalf of their clients. This would constitute a serious 
loss to the public at large.
Finally, most government agencies, including the SEC, oversee a domain 
which is much smaller in numbers, if not in influence, than that of the APB. 
There are in this country a vast number of corporations, partnerships, and 
private businesses which do not report to the SEC, to say nothing of not- 
for-profit organizations and those businesses, such as most insurance com­
panies and banks, which are regulated by other agencies. Thus, to hand 
the APB’s task to the SEC, even if the latter wanted it, would involve either 
a considerable extension of the Commission’s present powers or the possible 
coexistence of two or more sets of accounting standards. The SEC can 
oversee the actions of a private sector standard-setting board without taking 
over its basic task. Indeed, the SEC’s impact has been very real, as out­
lined more fully at pages 17-19 and 48-52.
It may at some time become clear beyond question that standard-setting 
cannot be left in private hands. But that time is not yet. Until it is shown 
without doubt that this task must be entrusted to government, we strongly 
prefer to keep it where it is. There are two prerequisites for the success of 
such an undertaking in the private sector. These are the existence of a tra­
dition of standard-setting and the participation, at the core of the process, 
of a well-organized profession anxious to make the process work. In the 
field of accounting, these two prerequisites are satisfied.
We also believe that the success of a standard-setting board in the private 
sector depends in the final analysis on acceptance of its standards by the 
business community, practicing accountants, the SEC, and the public. We 
are satisfied that such acceptance will be forthcoming provided:
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1. The standard-setting body possesses unassailable independence and 
objectivity in fact and in appearance.
2. There is significant participation by the financial reporting community 
in the process by which standards are set.
3. Standards are promulgated only after a public procedure which insures 
that all interested parties are heard and their views are considered.
4. The quality of pronouncements is high—there must be persuasive logic 
and supporting reasoning, consistency with agreed-upon objectives, 
room for professional judgment in appropriate circumstances, and per­
ceived usefulness to investors and the public.
5. The members of the accounting profession support the standards in 
attesting to the fairness of financial information.
We believe these criteria can be met by a private sector standard-setting 
group structured as proposed in this Report. Future events may possibly 
dictate more radical changes in the standard-setting process than we are 
now recommending; but such changes are not called for now, and they 
would not now be in the public interest.
Our preference for keeping the standard-setting function in the private 
sector is shared by the great majority of the organizations and individuals 
who gave evidence before us, including the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges and the SEC itself. Their view, in which we join, is that a con­
tinuing, dynamic relationship between a private standard-setting board 
and the SEC offers the greatest potential for future progress in financial 
accounting.
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CHAPTER 6
Present arrangements for formulating 
financial accounting standards
Operation and funding of the APB
A t  p r e s e n t , the issuance of authoritative pronouncements on financial 
accounting standards is virtually exclusively in the hands of the Accounting 
Principles Board, subject to oversight and, historically, occasional interven­
tion by the SEC. Other accounting bodies and trade organizations have 
committees or task forces which are concerned with these matters. They 
have conducted research on various aspects of financial accounting but 
hitherto they have been largely content to cooperate with the Board, to 
respond to its initiatives, and to accept its leadership in the field. As de­
scribed in more detail below, the SEC has also looked to the Board to take 
the initiative in setting standards, while reserving its right to reject or 
modify APB pronouncements. This right, however, has not been overtly 
exercised since 1963 when, in Accounting Series Release No. 96, the SEC 
overruled the Board’s hotly contested Opinion No. 2 by permitting both 
deferral and flow-through methods of accounting for the investment tax 
credit.
The APB consists of 18 members, all of whom must be members of the 
AICPA. At the present time, 14 are in public practice, two are academic 
accountants, one is engaged in industry, and one is a financial analyst. Of 
the 14 public practice seats, eight have been traditionally occupied by part­
ners of the eight largest firms in the profession. The APB is set up as a 
senior committee of the AICPA, responsible to the Institute’s governing
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Council through the Board of Directors and has vested in it by Council 
“the primary responsibility for establishing professional standards in the 
area of financial accounting and reporting. . . . ” The Board has the 
authority to issue pronouncements in its own name and is “responsible 
through its chairman for reviewing all statements on financial accounting 
and reporting to be published by any committee of the Institute, in con­
formity with policies adopted by the Board of Directors with respect to 
senior committees.” (The quoted passages in this paragraph are taken 
from the APB Charter.)
Members of the APB are appointed by the President of the Institute, 
with the approval of the Board of Directors. Each serves a three-year term 
with possible reappointment for a second three-year term. Written approval 
by at least two-thirds of the members is required before a pronouncement 
may be issued. This voting rule covers the two types of pronouncements 
issued by the Board, namely, “statements” and “opinions.” The essential 
difference between them is that only opinions are covered by the Council’s 
Special Bulletin of October 1964, quoted below, which requires that de­
partures from opinions in financial statements be disclosed either in foot­
notes to the statements or in the audit report.
The Board held its first meeting on September 11, 1959. Down to the 
end of 1971 it had held 68 meetings lasting 175 days and occupying ap­
proximately 3,350 man-days. From only two days of meetings in 1960 
it had increased its activity to 27 full days of meetings in 1971. It has had 
five chairmen during its 12 years of existence and 63 other members of the 
Institute have served on it. In addition, 19 nonmembers of the Board have 
served on its subcommittees, all but two of them CPAs. Five of these 19 
were former Board members.
All members of the APB, including its chairman, serve in a part-time 
capacity. Most members appear to devote from one-half to two-thirds of 
their time to the Board’s work. Most members of the Board are supported 
by an advisor, who normally also attends Board meetings, and other support 
is provided by their firms. None of this work is compensated by the Insti­
tute. Out-of-pocket expenses of members and their staffs are defrayed by 
the Institute if reimbursement is requested. Usually, it is not.
The staff support provided by the AICPA is drawn from the Accounting 
Research Division and the APB Administration Division of the Institute.
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The Accounting Research Division is headed by a director (the incumbent, 
Reed Storey, Ph.D., CPA, has held office since 1964) and the staff consists 
of four project managers and one assistant project manager with four cleri­
cal assistants. In addition, in a typical year, there will usually be from 
eight to ten consultants working on a variety of research projects.
The director of accounting research is responsible for the Institute’s 
accounting research program. He initiates, assigns, and supervises research 
projects. He participates with the chairman of the APB and the executive 
vice-president of the AICPA in planning the research program and appoint­
ing project advisory committees and their chairmen. He conducts special 
studies as requested by the chairman and provides drafting assistance in the 
preparation of opinions, reports, and advisory documents for the Board’s 
consideration.
The APB Administration Division was established in 1965. Its first di­
rector, Richard C. Lytle, M.B.A., CPA, formerly director of the Institute’s 
Technical Services Division,1 has held office since that time. He is aided 
by an assistant director, two managers, a research associate whose principal 
function is to prepare the interpretations of APB opinions, an administrative 
assistant, and two secretaries. The administrative director provides staff 
assistance to the Board and its chairman, including the preparation of 
agenda and other background material for meetings of the Board and its 
committees, and minutes. He makes arrangements for meetings, provides 
drafting assistance in consultation with the director of accounting research, 
maintains contact with the large number of organizations who are kept 
informed of the Board’s work, makes arrangements for the publication and 
distribution of Board pronouncements, and carries out other duties assigned 
to him by the chairman.
The two directors are at a coordinate level, each is autonomous within 
the scope of his authority, and each has the privilege of the floor at meet­
ings of the Board and its committees.
An analysis was prepared at our direction of the full cost of the Board’s 
work. This has risen steadily since 1965, partly because of inflation, and 
partly because of increased administrative support and the increasing level 
of activity of the Board. Details of the AICPA’s outlay for accounting 
research and APB administration since September 1, 1960 are given in 
Appendix D, page 97. In the Institute’s last full fiscal year ended August
1 Now called the Auditing and Reporting Division.
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31, 1971, the expenses of the two APB support divisions were as shown 
below:
Accounting APB
Research Administration
Division Division Total
Salaries, fees and
related expenses .................. $215,639 $171,327 $386,966
Administration expenses ....... 28,096 55,287 83,383
Meeting and travel expenses .. 7,927 35,978 43,905
 $251,662 $262,592 $514,254
The budget for 1971/72  projects expenditures of $277,000 for the Re­
search Division and $319,000 for the Administration Division. To this 
must be added estimated net charges of $72,000 to these activities from 
other divisions of the Institute, giving a total projected cash expenditure by 
the Institute for the APB for the current year of $668,000.
The foregoing, however, is only a small part of the cost of the Board’s 
work. The greater part of that cost is borne by the Board members’ firms. 
Our estimate puts it at $2,000,000 for the value of time contributed and 
$125,000 for meeting and travel expenses, or an aggregate of $2,125,000 
for the value of time and expenses of Board members. The estimate of the 
value of time contributed is based on a total of 40,000 hours per year 
for the 18 members and their staff assistants, priced at $50 an hour (a 
figure which includes an estimate of compensation plus the indirect cost of 
fringe benefits and secretarial support).
Putting these figures together gives a total of approximately $2,793,000 
as the annual cost of the Board’s work, before crediting some $260,000 
earned by the Institute from publications relating to the work of the Board. 
This still leaves out certain important hidden costs, notably those borne 
by firms whose partners or staffs work on Institute research projects. For 
studies such as ARS No. 10 on goodwill and ARS No. 11 on accounting 
for extractive industries, where the researchers were practitioners working 
without compensation from the AICPA, it is estimated that the value of 
the time contributed by the firms concerned may have been between $125,­
000 and $225,000.
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The research program of the APB
The AICPA committee report which can be said to have brought the 
APB into existence, the Powell Report of 1958, was entitled “Report to 
Council of the Special Committee on Research Program.” The commit­
tee’s title makes it clear that research was to be one of the main activities, if 
not the main activity, of the APB. “The accounting research program,” 
said the committee, “should be one of the most important activities of the 
Institute” ; and the APB, together with the accounting research staff, is 
described as “the organization for carrying out the proposed accounting 
research program and related activities of the Institute. . . . ”
The Institute’s Accounting Research Division was established in 1959 
and has had four directors. Their names and dates of appointment are:
P e r r y  M a s o n — appointed November 1959 
M a u r ic e  M o o n it z — appointed July 1960 
P a u l  G r a d y — appointed August 1963 
R e e d  S t o r e y — appointed September 1964
Paul Grady was formerly a practitioner. The other three directors came 
from the academic world.
At our direction, a detailed examination of the history and results of the 
Institute’s research program was made. By no standard that we can think 
of can this program be called a striking success. The outcome of 24 
studies authorized down to August 1967 is summarized below. (See table 
on page 30.) Several significant facts emerge:
1. No new studies have been authorized since August 1967.
2. Of the 24 separate studies authorized between September 1959 and 
August 1967, only 11 had resulted in publications before the end of 
1971. Ten will probably be published at a later date, and three were 
terminated.
3. Of the 11 published studies, four were in gestation for more than 50 
months. Three of these took 65 months or more.
4. For the as yet unpublished studies, the elapsed time since authorization 
down to the end of 1971 ranges from 54 months to 139 months.
5. No study authorized since the end of 1964 had resulted in a publication 
by the end of 1971; and only five studies authorized after 1959 had 
done so.
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A marked change has taken place in the assignment of research studies 
during the years since 1959. Of the 11 studies authorized during the pro­
gram’s first 12 months (including one which was merged into another study), 
six were assigned to academics, one to a practicing CPA, and four to staff 
members of the Accounting Research Division. Of the 15 authorized since 
then (including one which was subsequently merged into another project), 
only two were assigned to academic authors. The rest were divided almost 
equally between practitioners and staff members. Thus the reliance on 
practitioners has increased notably since 1960.
It cannot be said that this change has raised the program’s productivity. 
If one looks at the average elapsed time for completed studies between the 
appointment of an author and completion of his study, the results look 
like this:
These averages, however, are influenced by a single protracted academic 
study and a single rapidly completed practitioner study. Without these two 
studies, the averages would have been 29 months for academics and 62 
months for practitioners.
Practitioners also seem to take longer not to complete a project than 
academics. Of the ten projects still in process at the end of 1971, the two 
assigned to academics had an average elapsed time of 47 months since the 
author was assigned, compared with 63 months for practitioners and 66 
months for staff authors.
It seems likely that research projects in the past would have come to 
fruition faster if they had been assigned under contracts which required 
the researcher to devote his full time to the work. Teaching and committee 
assignments are as distracting for academics as client responsibilities are for 
practitioners. Research, like most other activities, suffers when the re­
searcher’s attention is divided. The research studies carried through most 
expeditiously bear this out. Only in exceptional cases should two years be 
required to complete a research study when it is worked on full-time. 
Normally one year or less should be enough. Full-time research should, we 
believe, be the normal pattern for the future.
No. of 
studies
Average 
elapsed time
Staff authors 
Academics .. 
Practitioners
3
5
3
22 months 
39 months 
48 months
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It might be supposed that members of the Accounting Research Divi­
sion’s staff would be able to devote all their time to projects to which they 
are assigned, and that their research productivity would be correspondingly 
higher. Unfortunately, there have been many demands on their time which 
have had the effect of drawing them away from their primary research 
activity. These demands have included drafting for the APB, work on spe­
cial projects, or, in the case of the Director himself, supervision of other 
projects within the Division while he continued to carry the burden of re­
search on one project himself.
When the APB’s Administration Division was established in 1965, it was 
intended that the Research Division would be released from day-to-day 
involvement in the work of the Board. This independence has not been 
achieved. Indeed, the distinction between the two divisions has become 
increasingly blurred. It appears that in the past two years some 3 0 -4 0 %  
of the Research Division’s effort has been devoted to routine drafting and 
other work for the Board which could not be called research. This in part 
explains why academics and practitioners to whom projects have been 
assigned have been allowed to proceed at their own pace. It is clear to us 
that tighter control could have reduced some of the inordinate delays which 
have afflicted several projects. There have also been regrettable delays in 
the selection of authors for important projects. It took 26 months after 
authorization to select an author for a study of inventory pricing, 27 months 
for a study of depreciation and 22 months for a project on working capital. 
This is hardly indicative of a sense of urgency.
Since 1959, when the Powell Report was implemented, a striking change 
has taken place in the importance attached to research in the standard- 
setting process. Though still important, it has lost its primacy in the Board’s 
thinking. Several recent opinions were not preceded by a published re­
search study nor were several of the matters now being actively consid­
ered by the Board. The Board’s research arm has not moved fast enough 
or effectively enough to keep up with the needs of a Board constantly under 
pressure to deal with the urgent items on its agenda. The men who are 
promulgating standards have outrun those who are doing the research.
Looking at the 21 opinions published down to the end of 1971, if one 
eliminates those minor ones for which no preparatory research was needed 
and groups the others according as they were or were not preceded by pub­
lished research studies, the following picture emerges. Of the seven major 
opinions published to the end of 1968, five were preceded by published
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research studies and two were not,2 whereas of the eight published since 
1968, three were preceded by published research studies and five were 
not. Moreover, of the three opinions since 1968 which were preceded by 
published research studies, one of them rested on research published 111 
months earlier (and authorized 21 months before that) and a second on 
research published 85 months earlier (and authorized 43 months before 
that). The details are given below.
Major APB Opinions Preceded By Published Research Studies
APB Prior Date Date
Opinion published of of
No. Topic ARS No. ARS Opinion
3/19 Funds Statement 2 1961 1963/71
5 /7 Leases 4 1962 1964/66
8 Pensions 8 1965 1966
11 Income Taxes 9 1966 1967
16 Business Combinations 5 1963 1970
17 Intangible Assets 10 1968 1970
Major APB Opinions Not Preceded By Published Research Studies
APB Date
Opinion of
No. Topic Opinion
2/4 Investment Credit 1962/64
9 Reporting the Results of Operations 1966
14 Convertible Debt 1969
15 Earnings per Share 1969
18 Investments in Common Stocks— Equity Method 1971
20 Accounting Changes 1971
21 Interest on Receivables and Payables 1971
The contrast between the early research hopes and the consequent 
achievement is even more striking if one looks at the items on the APB’s 
active agenda at the beginning of 1972. Eliminating minor items and 
amendments to prior opinions, there are 12 other items that might have 
been expected to be preceded by AICPA published research studies; yet, 
only two of them will have been so preceded. The other ten will result in 
standards not based on prior AICPA published research studies.
2 For this purpose, Opinions Nos. 2 and 4 are treated as a single opinion, since 
No. 4 simply countermanded No. 2.
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The activities of the Accounting Research Division have had a relatively 
greater impact on the Board’s statements than on its opinions. Of the four 
statements issued by the end of 1971, two (No. 3 on price level changes and 
No. 4 on basic concepts) were based in part on research studies. Statement 
No. 2 (on diversified companies) had no prior AICPA research study; and 
Statement No. 1 was a short statement disavowing Accounting Research 
Studies Nos. 1 and 3.
Of course, the fact that an AICPA-sponsored research study has not been 
published does not necessarily mean that the APB must act without the 
benefit of any research. In some subject areas, an abundance of theoretical 
and empirical research has been performed by academics, practitioners, 
and/or professional associations which is available for consideration by the 
Board. In such cases, a further research effort by the AICPA may not add 
measurably to the fund of knowledge and may, in fact, delay consideration 
of areas where standards are urgently needed.
It should also be noted that other professional associations have shown 
an increasing interest in sponsoring research on subjects under consideration 
by the APB. When competent research is expected to be forthcoming, the 
AICPA has indicated a willingness to await the results of research spon­
sored by other organizations rather than have its Accounting Research 
Division take on a project which might duplicate the work of others. An 
example is the research study on financial reporting by diversified companies 
prepared by Professor R. K. Mautz and sponsored by the Financial Exec­
utives Research Foundation.
In general, if one excludes Opinions Nos. 16 and 19, Board action has 
followed quite promptly on the completion of a research study— generally 
within two years. It seems to be a reasonable hypothesis, therefore, that if 
the Board’s research arm had been more productive, the Board’s effective­
ness might have been greater.
The productivity of accounting research, of course, depends not only on 
the quantity of output but also the quality of research performed and the 
extent to which the research is related to the needs of the pronouncing 
body. We shall not attempt any evaluation of the quality of the Account­
ing Research Division’s output. It is our impression, however, that research 
projects have not always been initiated with a clear statement of the issues 
before the Board and an indication of the types of evidence that the Board 
would consider persuasive in formulating an accounting standard. As a 
result, the Board has acted contrary to AICPA published research studies 
in a number of instances. We come to the inescapable conclusion that
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much of the work of the Accounting Research Division has not been 
related closely enough to the needs of the Board.
Our review of the research program prompts a number of recom­
mendations for the future which appear in Chapter 8 of this Report at 
pages 7 7 -7 8  below.
Involvement of outsiders in the work of the APB
Although made up exclusively of members of the AICPA, the APB 
has been at pains from the beginning to involve others in its work. 
Exposure drafts of opinions are now circulated very widely to the busi­
ness community, government agencies, academics, and professional and 
trade organizations; about 10,000 copies are sent to nonmembers of the 
Institute and to organizations other than accounting firms. In addition, 
some 90,000 copies are sent to individual members of the Institute and 
to accounting firms. It is not uncommon for the Board to receive 500 to 
1,000 letters of comment on exposure drafts.
In 1966, the first of a series of financial writers’ seminars was held by 
the Institute to help raise the level of understanding of the Board’s 
problems. In the following year, the first of a series of symposia was 
held at which invited organizations were asked to give their opinions on 
pre-exposure drafts. The purpose of the symposia was to help the Board 
to reach conclusions and not merely to invite reactions to conclusions 
already reached.
The first public hearings were held by the Board in 1971 on the valua­
tion of marketable securities and on accounting for extractive industries. 
These were a natural outgrowth of the symposia at which attendance had 
been by invitation only. The public hearings, which can now be expected 
to be a permanent feature of the Board’s procedures for sounding opinion, 
invited the expression of views from anyone who wished to appear.
However, many remain unsatisfied with these efforts. They assert either 
that the Board has already made up its mind before it holds a public 
hearing, in those instances when it does not respond to pressure, or that 
it is vacillating and spineless when it does. Well might the Board’s Chair­
man say in his opening statement at our public hearing that “in its 12- 
year history the Accounting Principles Board has produced four state­
ments, 21 opinions, and a thousand critics.”
Another input, in a sense external to the Board, has been obtained by 
bringing nonmembers, and even non-CPAs in one or two cases, onto
35
subcommittees of the Board. We think input of this sort could be greatly 
expanded and we shall have more to say about this matter below.
The output of the APB
Since its inception in 1959, the Board has issued 21 opinions and four 
statements. These are listed in Appendix E, pages 9 9-10 2 , together with 
information about their periods of gestation. A list of projects on the 
Board’s active agenda at the beginning of 1972 is also given. In a few 
cases, opinions of the Board have reversed or greatly modified earlier 
pronouncements so that the list of pronouncements slightly overstates the 
Board’s productivity. On the other hand, a simple tally of opinions and 
statements takes no account of the weight or quality of these pronounce­
ments. For example, Statement No. 4 ( “Basic Concepts and Accounting 
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises” ) is a 
substantial document representing years of work. Opinion No. 13, on the 
other hand, consists of two short paragraphs extending Opinion No. 9 
( “Reporting the Results of Operations” ) to commercial banks.
There have been tremendous variations in the elapsed time between the 
initiation and completion of APB projects. A project can be said to have 
been initiated when a research study is authorized, although (as previously 
shown) not all Board opinions have been preceded by formal research 
studies. An examination of Appendix E shows that Statement No. 4 holds 
the record (if Accounting Research Studies Nos. 1 and 3 can be said to 
be part of its gestation process) with an elapsed time of 133 months. 
Statement No. 3 ( “Financial Statements Restated for General Price-Level 
Changes” ),  published in June 1969, began with a research study author­
ized in April 1961; its elapsed time was therefore 98 months.
Among opinions, No. 16 ( “Business Combinations” ) had the most 
protracted history, beginning with a research study authorized in December 
1959 and concluding with the issuance of the Opinion in August 1970, an 
elapsed time of 128 months. Second in duration was Opinion No. 11 
( “Accounting for Income Taxes” ). The relevant research study was 
authorized in December 1959 and the Opinion was issued in December 
1967, an elapsed time of 96 months. On the other hand, Opinion No. 6 
( “Status of Accounting Research Bulletins” ), which was not the subject of 
a research study, took only 11 months between the appointment of a Board 
committee and the issuance of the Opinion. Opinion No. 10 ( “Omnibus 
Opinion— 1966” ) and Opinion No. 12 ( “Omnibus Opinion— 1967” ) took
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only 12 months and 11 months, respectively, from the appointment of a 
committee to the date of issuance of an opinion.
The quality of the Board’s output is much more difficult to evaluate 
and any evaluation must be highly subjective. Many would agree with 
the judgment of Marshall Armstrong, President of the AICPA in 1970-71, 
that “the Board has a significant record of accomplishment.” On the 
other hand, Robert Trueblood, himself a former member of the Board, 
appraised the first decade of the Board’s work and concluded that the 
value of the Board’s accomplishments “has not been proportionate to the 
human and monetary resources that have been expended.” 3
In discussions of the quality of APB pronouncements, a common form 
of disparagement is to liken many of them to a “cookbook.” Professor 
Paton refers to “the unfortunate tendency of the Board to explore details 
and endeavor to take a positive position on all sorts of minor points.” 4 
Like many critics who have chosen this point of attack, he focuses on 
Opinion No. 15 ( “Earnings Per Share” ) as his main target. “Of course,” 
he says, “obscurity and unnecessary detail are not all that is wrong with 
this particular Opinion. The basic objection to it is that the subject should 
never have been tackled in the first place.” He goes on to complain that 
“the Board is no longer content to express opinions; it is now issuing 
hard-and-fast rules and directives.” 5
But there is another side to this question. It is virtually certain that, 
if the Board contented itself with broad generalizations, it might placate 
some critics but would provoke others, for it would then be accused of 
uttering platitudes. It is extremely doubtful that broad generalizations 
would satisfy the needs of public investors as seen by the SEC. The de­
tailed prescriptions of Opinion No. 15 were, in fact, prompted by what 
appeared to be the ineffectiveness of the broader standards for reporting 
earnings per share in Part II of Opinion No. 9 ( “Reporting the Results 
of Operations” ) which were, in turn, prompted by the serious concerns 
of the SEC. In a recent address to the National Association of Accoun­
tants, Commissioner James J. Needham of the SEC referred to Opinion 
No. 15 in these words:
3 “Ten Years of the APB: One Practitioner’s Appraisal,” an address by Robert M. 
Trueblood before the annual meeting of the American Accounting Association, 
August 27, 1969.
4 W. A. Paton, “Earmarks of a Profession— and the APB,” The Journal of Ac­
countancy (January 1971), p. 42.
5 Ibid.
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I know many of you believe that only a “Philadelphia lawyer” could 
possibly interpret Opinion 15. Certainly, it’s not easy. But to put an 
end to all the abuses conceived by very resourceful people in the com ­
putation of earnings per share required a comprehensive and necessarily 
complicated opinion.
If attempting to narrow the wide range of alternative financial account­
ing methods applicable in like factual situations is a proper function for 
the Board, it is difficult to see how effective standards can be formulated 
at the level of broad generalization. Good cooks do not sneer at cook­
books; and they would not think much of a recipe which called for “a 
fair amount of flour” or “an appropriate number of eggs.” However, in 
setting standards the Board ought to avoid attempting to deal with their 
application under every conceivable set of circumstances, no matter how 
rare or obscure.
The Board’s opinions have been criticized for giving too little explana­
tion and justification of the conclusions reached and too little discussion 
of the alternatives which the Board rejected. We believe this criticism is 
valid. In the interests of brevity— a quality we do not deplore— the Board 
seems to us to have missed opportunities to educate the accounting 
profession as well as the entire financial reporting community.
Moreover, by giving more attention to rejected alternatives in drafting 
an opinion, it would be practicable for the Board to dispense with the 
publication of dissenting views as a part of the opinion. The attachment 
of dissents to opinions doubtless has some educational value but the 
practice can also create both uncertainty and confusion. Perhaps for this 
reason, almost all agencies of government and other authorities which issue 
rulings do not include dissenting opinions as part of such rulings, although 
dissents are of course properly a part of the public record of agency 
action. The Hanson Committee, which reported to the Institute’s Execu­
tive Committee6 in 1969 on the APB’s operations, said “it is the feeling 
of many that the provision for public dissent in the opinion has done more 
to damage the image of the APB, and therefore the profession, than al­
most any other single item.”
The Hanson Committee recommended that “dissents not be printed in 
those cases where an APB Opinion receives the necessary two-thirds 
majority.” This recommendation was not adopted. We agree with the
6 What was formerly the Executive Committee has, since 1969, been known as the 
Board of Directors.
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Hanson Committee and offer a recommendation on this matter below 
at page 74. The better way to give minority views the attention they de­
serve is by explaining in the discussion section supplemental to an opinion 
why the majority of the Board did not accept them.
The status of APB opinions
Departures from APB opinions. To understand the present status of 
Board opinions, it is necessary to go back to the year 1948 when the 
membership of the AICPA approved a special report of the Committee on 
Auditing Procedure laying down certain standards of reporting. In 1962, 
these standards were incorporated into the Committee’s codification of its 
work to that time as Chapter 2 of Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 33 
( “Auditing Standards and Procedures” ). The first standard of reporting, 
as it there appears, reads: “The report shall state whether the financial 
statements are presented in accordance with generally accepted principles 
of accounting.”
This reporting standard is given force by Article 2 of the Institute’s 
Code of Professional Ethics. Rule 2 .0 2 (e ) reads:
In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which 
he has examined, a member or associate may be held guilty of an act dis­
creditable to the profession if . . .
(e )  he fails to direct attention to any material departure from generally 
accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material omission of 
generally accepted auditing procedure applicable in the circumstances.
In his historic address to the AICPA’s annual meeting in New Orleans 
in October 1957 in which the concept of the Accounting Principles Board 
was first presented, Alvin Jennings, the Institute’s President, proposed that 
“statements issued by the research organization [he was here referring to 
what became the APB] should be submitted for approval or rejection of 
basic ideas to the Council of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. . . . Upon receiving approval of two-thirds of the members 
of Council voting upon any particular bulletin, it should be considered 
binding upon members of our Institute.” 7 This suggestion did not com­
mend itself to the Special Committee on Research Program (the Powell 
Committee) to which Mr. Jennings’ proposals were referred by Council. 
That committee proposed the establishment of an Accounting Principles 
Board, expressing its own view in the following words:
7 The Journal of Accountancy (January 1958), p. 32.
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We have concluded that only rarely should a pronouncement be given the 
degree of finality represented by adoption of the principle by the Council 
or possibly by the membership of the Institute. The Board would be 
expected to review its past pronouncements from time to time, and in a few  
instances might decide that a particular statement was of such great signifi­
cance and had received such general support and acceptance, that it should 
be given formal recognition and become mandatory upon the membership 
of the Institute. In such cases the Board would include recommendations 
for such action in its report to the Council. We feel that the best method 
of enforcing most of the Board’s pronouncements would be to secure their 
acceptance as high authority by professional accountants in advising clients 
and in preparing reports on financial statements.
It is worth mentioning that the Chairman of this committee, Weldon 
Powell, was soon to become the APB’s first chairman; three other mem­
bers, Carman Blough, formerly Chief Accountant of the SEC, Arthur 
Cannon and Leonard Spacek, were among the Board’s original members; 
another, Paul Grady, was for a short time the Institute’s Director of 
Accounting Research; and two other members, William Werntz and An­
drew Barr were successively Chief Accountant of the SEC. Such an array 
of talent gave the Powell Committee’s report unusual authority.
The course recommended by the Powell Committee was adopted when 
the APB came into existence in 1959. The Board’s pronouncements were 
“expected to be regarded as authoritative written expressions of gen­
erally accepted accounting principles,” to quote from the Board’s original 
Charter; but, as the Executive Committee said in its Special Report to 
Council in March 1964, “there is at present no means of assuring either 
that they will be universally followed or that departures from them will 
be disclosed by independent auditors.”
Alvin Jennings was one of the APB’s original members; he took over 
the chairmanship from Weldon Powell in 1963. In June 1963, by a vote 
of eleven to eight, the Board proposed to the Executive Committee of 
Council that the auditing standard and rule of ethics cited above should 
be amended “as may be required to provide that in addition to the obliga­
tion of members to report departures from generally accepted accounting 
principles they shall also be required to include a report as to departures 
from opinions of the Accounting Principles Board.” This proposal was 
rejected by the Executive Committee, because it appeared to recognize 
two sets of standards, “generally accepted accounting principles” and 
the opinions of the Board. In its place, in its Special Report of March
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1964, the Executive Committee put to Council a much stronger proposal, 
the essential part of which was that
when a pronouncement of the Accounting Principles Board has become 
effective, that pronouncement shall be considered as constituting the only 
“generally accepted accounting principle” in the subject area covered for 
purposes of expressing an opinion on financial statements, within the mean­
ing of Rule 2 .0 2 (e )  of the Code of Professional Ethics and the first stan­
dard of reporting . . . unless and until the Council rescinds such pro­
nouncement of the Board.
The effect of adoption of this proposal would be that a member of the 
Institute, in expressing an opinion on financial statements in which a 
material item was dealt with in a manner different from that recommended 
in a pronouncement of the Accounting Principles Board which had become 
effective, would be required in his report to “direct attention” to the fact 
that this item was not presented in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles.
This proposal was too restrictive in its meaning of “generally accepted 
accounting principles” to commend itself to a majority of Council, but a 
substitute motion was carried to the effect that “it [was] the sense of 
this Council that audit reports of members should disclose material de­
partures from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board,” and the 
question of implementation was referred to a special committee to be set 
up by the President for the purpose. This committee, the Seidman Com­
mittee, worked on the problem through the summer of 1964 and came 
forward with a set of recommendations which Council accepted at its 
fall meeting, and which are still in effect. These were promulgated in a 
Special Bulletin issued by Council to the members in October 1964. The 
essential passages are as follows:
The Council of the Institute, at its meeting October 2, 1964, unanimously 
adopted recommendations that members should see to it that departures 
from Opinions o f the Accounting Principles Board (as well as effective 
Accounting Research Bulletins issued by the former Committee on A c­
counting Procedure) are disclosed, either in footnotes to financial state­
ments or in the audit reports of members in their capacity as independent 
auditors.
* * *
“Generally accepted accounting principles” are those principles which 
have substantial authoritative support.
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Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board constitute “substantial 
authoritative support.”
“Substantial authoritative support” can exist for accounting principles 
that differ from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board.
* * *
If an accounting principle that differs materially in its effect from one 
accepted in an Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board is applied in 
financial statements, the reporting member must decide whether the 
principle has substantial authoritative support and is applicable in the 
circumstances.
If he concludes that it does not, he would either qualify his opinion, 
disclaim an opinion, or give an adverse opinion as appropriate. . . .
If he concludes that it does have substantial authoritative support:
( 1 )  he would give an unqualified opinion and
( 2 )  disclose the fact of departure from the opinion in a separate para­
graph in his report or see that it is disclosed in a footnote to the 
financial statements and, where practicable, its effects on the 
financial statements.
The Special Bulletin instructed the APB to include in each opinion a 
notation that members should disclose a material departure therefrom. 
Accordingly, every opinion from No. 6 onwards has carried a notation 
in line with Council’s recommendation, together with the warning that 
the burden of justifying departures from Board opinions must be as­
sumed by those who adopt other practices. Disclosures in accordance 
with the Special Bulletin of such departures from APB opinions have 
been rare.
The Special Bulletin of October 1964 described a failure to disclose a 
material departure from an Accounting Principles Board opinion as “sub­
standard reporting.” This phrase is explained in a footnote to mean “re­
porting practices not in conformity with recommendations of the Council” 
and the Practice Review Committee was instructed to give its attention 
to this area. Infractions of Council’s recommendations were not considered 
at the time to be a breach of the Code of Ethics. However, after further 
study of this question, the Seidman Committee, in a second report to 
Council in the spring of 1965, recommended that, after an interval for 
education and adaptation to the Special Bulletin, the Code of Ethics should 
be changed.
There is a rule of professional ethics dealing with failure to observe 
generally accepted accounting principles. Likewise, there should even­
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tually be a rule of professional ethics dealing with failure to disclose de­
partures from Opinions of the Board.
* * *
The public posture of the profession should be supported by the highest 
ethical standards. Certainly, Council’s resolution gains more authority 
with a corresponding ethics rule than without one.
The Committee thought that an interval of three years should be allowed 
before asking Council and members of the Institute to vote on an amend­
ment to the Code of Professional Ethics. Council approved such a change 
in 1969; but in a mail ballot of the members, the proposal narrowly 
failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.
We understand that a complete revision of the Code of Ethics is 
presently under consideration and will, if approved by Council, come be­
fore the membership for a vote late in 1972. Included in the revised 
Code is a new Rule 203 which provides:
A  member shall not express an opinion that financial statements are 
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles if 
such statements contain any departure from an Opinion of the Accounting 
Principles Board which has a material effect on the statements taken as a 
whole, unless the member can demonstrate that due to unusual circum­
stances the departure is necessary to a fair presentation. In such cases his 
report must describe the departure, the approximate effects thereof, if 
practicable, and the reasons why compliance with the Opinion would not 
result in a fair statement.
Rule 203 differs from the earlier proposal in that it sanctions departures 
from an opinion on the basis of “unusual circumstances” and “fair presen­
tation” rather than “substantial authoritative support.” However, it would 
make adherence to the opinions under normal circumstances enforceable 
under the profession’s Code of Ethics. We think such a change in the 
Code of Professional Ethics is highly desirable, as evidence of the profes­
sion’s commitment to the development of effective standards of financial 
reporting. In light of the recommendations in this Report, we suggest 
that proposed Rule 203 be revised so that opinions of the new Financial 
Accounting Standards Board would be enforceable under that Rule.
Susceptibility of APB opinions to legal attack. There are possibly four 
legal avenues by which actions of the APB, or of the new Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board which we propose in Chapter 8, might be sub­
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jected to attack, namely, arguments that such actions (a )  inflict tortious 
injury upon a company whose reported financial position or results of 
operations are affected thereby, (b )  violate the antitrust laws, (c )  flow 
from an unconstitutional or otherwise improper delegation of power by 
the SEC, or (d )  violate the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Only the first of these avenues has been the subject of a court case. 
In 1959 the Committee on Accounting Procedure of the AICPA (the 
predecessor of the A PB) announced a proposal to interpret the phrase 
“deferred tax account” appearing in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 44 
to mean a liability and not an equity account. Certain subsidiaries of 
American Electric Power Company had previously taken the position 
that deferred tax accounts should be classified as a part of stockholders’ 
equity. Unhappy with the prospect that their aggregate balance sheet 
liabilities would increase (with potential adverse effects upon bond inden­
ture ratios and the like), they sued to enjoin the issuance of the pro­
nouncement on the ground of prima facie tort, or the intentional infliction 
of injury without just cause.8 The suit was unsuccessful. Absent a showing 
of actual malice or its equivalent, the Second Circuit said, courts “may not 
dictate or control the procedures by which a private organization expresses 
its honestly held views.” Indeed, in the court’s opinion, a professional 
body “accepts a public obligation for the unfettered expression of its 
views.”
As previously pointed out, the APB’s membership is made up solely 
of CPAs who are members of the Institute. Our proposal for a Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (Chapter 8 ) contemplates that a minority 
of the Board may consist of persons who are not CPAs although they must 
be well versed in the problems of financial reporting. Would such a 
change weaken the force of the Appalachian Power decision as a shield 
against legal attack on the Board’s pronouncements? Based on a careful 
reading of the Second Circuit’s opinion and a review of its reasoning, we 
think not. The essence of a successful defense lies in the freedom of the 
private body from any motive, economic or otherwise, to do injury to 
anyone. That freedom is best assured by the elimination of even the 
appearance of conflict of interest and by the fact of independent sponsor­
ship. Our proposals, we believe, will strengthen the Board’s status in this 
vital respect.
8 Appalachian Power Co. v. AICPA, 177 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd per 
curiam, 268 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 887 (1959).
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Freedom from economic motivation is also a key element in protect­
ing the Board and its pronouncements from attack on antitrust grounds. 
Private and professional organizations are not immune from the antitrust 
laws and a number of cases have been successfully brought in the past 
against private standard-setting bodies. These cases demonstrate that it 
is where superficially objective standards have been utilized for the pur­
pose of reducing competition or injuring others who are differently situ­
ated economically that antitrust principles clearly apply. By contrast, in 
the absence of such economic motivation, and given a rational basis and 
procedures adequate to avoid patent unfairness, collaborative action in 
developing standards has not been held subject to antitrust liability.
It has been urged by some, although not as yet in litigation, that certain 
opinions of the APB are vulnerable on antitrust grounds because they 
are, assertedly, “inherently unreasonable” or have a discriminatory im­
pact upon certain businesses. In our view, these arguments must fail so 
long as the particular pronouncement of the Board is one as to which 
reasonable men can honestly differ, and so long as the men who voted 
it are unmotivated by commercial self-interest. We cite as illustrative 
authority United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. 
Pa. 1966);  Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass’n, 399 
F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1 9 6 8 ), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024; and cf. Marjorie 
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass’n of Colleges and Sec­
ondary Schools, Inc. (C.A.D.C. 1 9 7 0 ), 432 F.2d 650.
It is conceivable that an argument might be advanced to the general 
effect that opinions of the Board are the result of an improper or un­
constitutional delegation of the powers reposed by Congress in the SEC. 
To this argument there are several answers. Although to a major extent 
the APB exercises its function in an area which the Commission could 
preempt if it chose, nevertheless the APB’s authority does not in any sense 
derive from the Commission. The APB could issue its opinions even if 
there were no Federal Securities Acts. Moreover, as has previously been 
pointed out, there are large numbers of firms and corporations over which 
neither the SEC nor any other Federal agency has authority in matters 
of accounting, but as to which the pronouncements of the APB apply 
so long as the financial statements of such companies are audited by 
members of the AICPA.
Nothing in either the language or legislative history of the Federal 
Securities Acts suggests that Congress intended to preempt the establish­
ment of financial accounting standards. Moreover, there has been nothing
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approaching an explicit delegation of authority by the SEC to the APB. 
At most, the Commission has left the initiative to the APB, reserving its 
own right of contrary decision and also letting its views, and those of 
its staff, be known for the guidance of the APB. We are aware of no 
judicial pronouncement indicating that such a procedure would be equiv­
alent, for legal purposes, to delegation of authority in the constitutional 
sense.
Finally, the considerations which have been discussed immediately 
above would appear adequate to dispose of the argument that actions of 
the APB or its successor might be susceptible to an attack based on the 
principles of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA” ).  
This Act has no direct application to the APB or any other body operat­
ing in the private sector. Even assuming that the issue turned solely on 
the operating procedures of the APB, irrespective of legal technicalities, 
it should be a sufficient answer that the APB’s procedures (including pub­
lic notice of its proposed opinions, the opportunity for submission of 
written views by interested persons, and the holding of public hearings 
on topics of substantial importance) have evolved to the point where 
they are superior in some respects even to the specific requirements of 
the APA.
Interpretation of APB opinions
Since 1969, the Administration Division of the APB has been respon­
sible for preparing and issuing what at first were called “unofficial account­
ing interpretations” of APB pronouncements. These are published in The 
Journal of Accountancy and in the looseleaf service and bound volumes 
of APB Accounting Principles. Over 50,000 copies of the longest in­
terpretation, a substantial booklet on Opinion No. 15 ( “Earnings Per 
Share” ),  have been issued. In addition to the booklet, 144 interpretations 
were published down to the end of 1971 and many more were under 
consideration at that time.
Most of the research and drafting for interpretations is done by a 
research associate in the Administration Division. Topics to be covered 
are sometimes suggested by questions raised by CPA firms, sometimes 
by persistent questions coming into the Institute’s Technical Information 
Service, and sometimes by the APB’s Planning Committee as a way of 
getting narrow points disposed of pending a fuller review of an already 
issued opinion. The interpretations are designed to clarify and amplify
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language in an opinion which is thought to be too vague or to apply 
the opinion to circumstances that were not contemplated at the time it 
was written.
Before an interpretation is issued, it must be approved by the admin­
istrative director of the APB, by the executive vice-president of the 
Institute, and by the chairman of the APB. More recently, some inter­
pretations have been reviewed by the full Board prior to issuance and 
have been the subject of informal votes.
In the summer of 1971, accounting interpretations ceased to be “un­
official” simply by deleting this adjective from their title. They did not 
by this act become “official” for they are still not pronouncements of the 
Board. Their status is described in a statement which now accompanies 
each interpretation as follows:
The Institute staff has been authorized to issue interpretations of account­
ing questions having general interest to the profession. The purpose of 
the interpretations is to provide guidance on a timely basis without the 
formal procedures required for an APB Opinion and to clarify points on 
which past practice may have varied and been considered generally ac­
cepted. These interpretations, which are reviewed with informed members 
o f the profession, are not pronouncements of the Board. However, mem­
bers should be aware that they may be called upon to justify departures 
from the interpretations.
When the interpretation service started in 1969, it was thought of by 
those most directly concerned with it as a staff function in which the 
APB itself would not be much involved. Gradually, however, it begins 
to look more and more as though the Board is developing a second, more 
informal brand of opinion which can be issued in a hurry without the 
formality of obtaining a two-thirds vote of the Board. The Chairman of 
the Board, in his oral statement at our public hearing, said: “When events 
create an urgency to move faster, the Interpretation route is taken and 
the effect [is] immediate, as in the case of computer leasing. This proce­
dure is a recent development in the Board’s operations, and many critics 
have not yet digested the full significance of it.” Critics of this procedure 
can be excused if they take these words to mean that the Board is indeed 
now issuing “two classes of authoritative pronouncements, one called 
Opinions and one called interpretations and attributed to other author­
ship.”9 It seems to us that this recent development might possibly jeop­
9 From the statement submitted to us by Arthur Young & Company.
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ardize the deliberative process which the Board in general has been at 
great pains to preserve.
At the same time, it is easy to sympathize with an over-burdened part- 
time Board when it seeks to avoid delay in getting expressions of view 
by the full Board. It would be easier for a full-time board to have inter­
pretations prepared and to issue them expeditiously with its full authority. 
This is one of several reasons which have led us to favor a full-time 
board.
Government agencies and the APB
The SEC and the APB. Since 1934, the SEC has been empowered to 
prescribe the form and content of financial statements filed by reporting 
companies 10 and to specify the methods to be followed in their prepara­
tion.
Early in its administration of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Commission adopted Regulation S-X setting forth the required form and 
content of financial statements. With certain limited exceptions, certifica­
tion of all financial statements by independent public accountants was re­
quired. The matters to be covered by the accountants’ opinion were 
specified. Standards of independence were formulated. Requirements for 
disclosure of the effects of changes in accounting principles or practices 
were promulgated.
However, despite the acknowledged breadth of its powers to prescribe 
accounting principles and practices, the Commission has elected not to 
preempt the field. Instead, it has encouraged the accounting profession 
to take the lead in developing financial accounting and reporting standards, 
reserving to itself, for the most part, the role of overseer to “criticize and 
prod.” 11 This policy has continued to the present day. It is based on 
several important considerations.
First, a role of great importance in carrying out the disclosure philos­
ophy of the Federal Securities Acts is assigned to the independent public 
accountant. Under the statutory scheme, substantial reliance is placed
10 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all nonexempt companies with over 
$1,000,000 of assets and 500 shareholders of record must file periodic reports, in­
cluding financial statements, with the SEC.
11 Statement of the SEC to the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, February 
19, 1964.
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upon him for a painstaking review of the financial statements, which are 
the heart of the registration document. To perform such a responsibility 
adequately requires a high sense of dedication to a professional ideal. 
Early leaders of the Commission may well have sensed that if accountants 
were to maintain such dedication, it would be wise to give them the 
primary responsibility for improving the usefulness and reliability of 
financial statements. Otherwise, in the long run, the public interest might 
suffer.
Secondly, the Commission has long recognized that the task of im­
proving financial accounting standards is one of great complexity, demand­
ing large expenditures of time and talent. It has chosen to use its small 
accounting staff to meet the pressing demands of day-to-day administra­
tion. Little likelihood has existed of obtaining the additional appropria­
tions necessary to hire a substantially larger accounting staff which could 
be devoted to research on accounting standards. The alternative has been 
to insist that the institutions of the profession take the initiative in this 
vital area.
Moreover, with few exceptions, opinions of the APB have been followed 
voluntarily by accountants practicing before the Commission, however 
vigorous the debate which preceded their adoption. The Commission’s 
decision to leave the initiative to the APB has been influenced, beyond 
doubt, by the marked degree to which the Board’s opinions commanded 
acceptance by the profession without the exercise of explicit enforcement 
power.
Summarizing its policy in connection with Congressional hearings in 
1964, the Commission observed:
Much improvement in financial reporting practices has occurred since the 
enactment of the first Federal securities law in 1933. The Commission be­
lieves that its policy of working with and supporting the accounting profes­
sion in the development of accounting principles has directly influenced 
this progress and is the best means of assuring continuing improvement of 
accounting practices.12
In accordance with this policy, the Commission has in fact worked with 
the accounting profession in the development of accounting principles in 
a number of ways. Through the years, an AICPA Committee on Rela­
tions with the SEC and Stock Exchanges has met from time to time with
12 Ibid.
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the accounting staff of the Commission to discuss areas in need of attention 
in financial accounting. The staff has not hesitated to suggest that items 
it considers important be placed on the APB’s agenda. Where resolution 
of a particular matter might otherwise have been delayed, both the Com­
mission staff and individual members of the Commission have pressed the 
APB for action. The staff has regularly submitted comments on exposure 
drafts of proposed APB opinions after clearing such comments with the 
Commission. We believe this useful interchange could be strengthened 
without injury to the role and responsibility of the private standard-setting 
body. A recommendation along these lines appears on pages 75-76.
It has often been observed, somewhat loosely, that the Commission 
“enforces” observance of the APB’s opinions by issuers of securities who 
must file registration statements. This observation may lead to a mis­
conception of the relationship between the Commission’s administrative 
functions and improvements in financial accounting. In reviewing regis­
tration statements, particularly those filed under the Securities Act of 1933, 
the Commission’s staff necessarily exercises a large measure of discretion. 
Registration statements and prospectuses are required to contain the dis­
closures specified in various registration forms officially adopted by the 
Commission, but these forms describe areas of required disclosure only 
in general terms. Over the years, the character and quality of prospectus 
disclosure has been largely shaped by staff comments on individual filings, 
often preceded or followed by informal conference between the staff and 
lawyers or accountants for the registrant, rather than by formal administra­
tive proceedings.13 The process has been an evolutionary one, as it applies 
both to the text and to the financial statements contained in prospectuses.
What are the sources of experience which contribute to this process? 
They are many: the observed results of particular offerings, complaints of 
investors, internal staff studies on particular subjects, conferences with 
registrants and their advisors, and such products of outside research and 
analysis as the bulletins of the AICPA’s Committee on Accounting Proce­
dure and the opinions of the APB. All of these may contribute new in­
sight as to those types of disclosure which may be more informative, on
13 Two important Commission rules are pertinent to this process: Rule 408 under 
the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 3-06 of Regulation S-X. These rules are similar 
in their import. Referring specifically to the financial statements, Rule 3-06 says: 
The information required with respect to any statement shall be furnished as a 
minimum requirement, to which shall be added such further material informa­
tion as is necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circum­
stances under which they are made, not misleading.
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the one hand, or which may possess the potential for misleading investors, 
on the other, in contrast to previously permitted disclosure patterns. 
Pronouncements of the APB— a competent professional body dedicated 
to improving financial reporting— obviously bear great weight with the 
SEC, even though, on occasion, it has permitted or required registrants 
to follow practices contrary to APB opinions.
Several critics, notably Professor Homer Kripke,14 have questioned 
whether, by making use of opinions of the APB in the course of ad­
ministering disclosure policy, the SEC may have engaged in what amounts 
to rule-making in violation of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
(the “APA” ).
The pertinent provisions of the APA appear to be those of 5 United 
States Code Sec. 553 requiring, as to agency rule-making, that general 
notice of a proposed rule be published in the Federal Register; that this 
be done at least 30 days prior to the proposed effective date; that there 
be furnished an opportunity for interested persons to submit written data, 
views, and arguments (although not necessarily an oral presentation); 
and that the agency provide a right of interested persons to petition for 
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. These formal requirements 
are not applicable to “interpretative rules” or “statements of policy.” It 
may be noted that most of the pronouncements the Commission has made 
with respect to matters of accounting practice have not been by way of 
formal rule-making, but rather by Accounting Series Releases or opinions 
of the Chief Accountant, presumably because the Commission has con­
sidered them to be “interpretative rules” or “statements of policy.”
We doubt that the APA was intended to prevent the sort of evolutionary 
progress in disclosure policy which has been described earlier in this 
Chapter of our Report. Indeed, no one has ever challenged the SEC on 
such grounds. The Study discussed Professor Kripke’s point with Philip 
A. Loomis, Jr., formerly General Counsel and now Commissioner of the 
SEC. Mr. Loomis advised us that in his opinion the Commission’s 
administration of the disclosure requirements of the Federal Securities 
Acts in regard to financial statements has not been in conflict with the 
APA.
The role of the SEC in assuring high standards of financial reporting 
to public investors is a crucial one. The Commission has been sensitive
14 Homer Kripke, “The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities,” 
N Y U  Law Review  45, No. 6 (December 1970), pp. 1151-1205. See particularly 
pp. 1151 and 1181.
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to the need for greater coordination between the registration process under 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the periodic reporting process under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Among other events, the recently 
adopted Rule 144 and Form S-16 show that increasing reliance will be 
placed on the 1934 Act reporting process to provide the public with up- 
to-date and informative financial data. Careful review of such periodic 
filings by a highly, competent staff is important, and in the view of many, 
the present accounting staff of the Commission is not adequate for this 
task.
Other governmental agencies and the APB. The interest of governmental 
agencies (other than the SEC) in the accounting area varies among 
agencies depending principally on their statutory purposes. Most agencies 
have statutory authority to prescribe the accounting and reporting proce­
dures of companies subject to their jurisdiction. Many agencies have in 
fact established uniform systems of account designed to meet their partic­
ular regulatory needs, which include rate-making, awarding of franchises 
or operating rights, approving the issuance of securities, passing upon 
mergers of regulated companies, and the like.
No governmental agency except the SEC is primarily concerned with 
financial reporting to investors. Such agencies as the Federal Communica­
tions Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board have in general 
permitted companies under their jurisdiction to follow generally accepted 
accounting principles, including opinions of the APB, in reporting to 
shareholders, despite the fact that their own accounting procedures and 
rules may be inconsistent with those principles or opinions. In 1962, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission adopted an order permitting carriers 
under its jurisdiction which desired to do so to publish financial state­
ments in reports to their shareholders based on generally accepted account­
ing principles at variance with the ICC’s prescribed accounting rules. 
However, many railroads continue to report to their shareholders in 
accordance with the ICC’s rules rather than generally accepted account­
ing principles.
Most agencies take the position that they have the power, under their 
statutes, to require reports to shareholders to conform to their own ac­
counting procedures. In the case of the Federal Power Commission, that 
power has been judicially confirmed.15 There are indications today that
15 Appalachian Power Company v. Federal Power Commission, 328 F.2d 237 (4th 
Cir. 1964); cert. denied 379 U.S. 829.
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governmental agencies other than the SEC may in fact become more in­
volved in financial reporting, particularly in view of the Congressional 
criticism of the ICC for alleged failure to protect the shareholders of the 
Penn Central, and the concern of some regulated companies that presently 
accepted (or proposed) accounting practices may affect their ability to 
finance their operations.
Early in its history, the APB issued an “Addendum” to Opinion No. 2 
which is still in effect and which permitted accounting methods prescribed 
by a regulatory agency in the course of the rate-making process to be 
used in financial reports to shareholders, even though these methods 
ordinarily would not be in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. For example, such principles would not normally permit a 
casualty loss to be capitalized; but if a regulatory agency will permit 
recovery of such a loss in establishing future rates, the “Addendum” to 
Opinion No. 2 permits capitalization of such a loss for reporting purposes. 
This approach is necessary to match costs and related revenues in these 
circumstances. However, when a governmental agency imposes account­
ing requirements for financial reporting to investors which are not directly 
related to the rate-making process, the effect may be to accomplish a 
regulatory purpose at the risk of misleading present and potential in­
vestors. Unless government agencies are careful to avoid such procedures, 
the process of improving financial accounting in the public interest could 
be jeopardized.
One other agency of the Federal Government, not concerned with 
regulation, has a substantial interest in financial accounting standards. We 
refer to the U.S. Treasury Department which is responsible for administer­
ing the Federal income tax laws. Taxable income may differ substantially 
from the income reported to shareholders in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles. This follows from the fact that the tax 
laws and the regulations of the Treasury Department have economic or 
social objectives not necessarily consistent with the most informative re­
porting of the results of operations. In such instances, it has generally 
been Treasury Department policy not to insist that the financial account­
ing followed by a taxpayer conform to the tax accounting used. Where 
policy objectives do not supervene, however, and two or more alternative 
accepted methods of accounting are available (one of which may produce 
substantial tax benefits whereas the other would produce the most in­
formative statements to investors) the Treasury Department has indicated 
a desire to secure conformity of income determination methods used for
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tax and financial statement purposes, i.e., to require that a particular 
method may be used for tax accounting only if that same method is also 
used in preparing the financial statements.
Fortunately, the Study gained the impression from conferences with 
Treasury Department officials that the Department is aware of the prob­
lems which could be created by unwise conformity requirements. Although 
some divergences are inevitable, the basic objectives of tax and financial 
accounting are essentially the same insofar as the accurate measurement 
of business income is concerned. The Study hopes that it will be the 
policy of the Treasury Department to work toward narrowing the gap 
between tax and financial accounting, wherever possible, by embracing 
accepted financial accounting standards for tax purposes. That policy will 
be easier for the Treasury Department to implement if more rapid progress 
can be made in reducing the number of unjustified alternatives available 
in financial accounting.
Generally speaking, we do not believe that government officials desire 
to inhibit the development in the private sector of sound financial ac­
counting standards. Most recognize the public interest implications of 
such standards. In one or two recent instances, government agencies may 
have concerned themselves with reporting to shareholders partly because 
they were confronted with urgent accounting issues which they believed 
the APB would not resolve on a sufficiently timely basis. We believe that 
the new Standards Board proposed in Chapter 8 of this Report will reduce 
the pressure for government agencies (other than the SEC) to become 
involved in financial reporting to investors.
The Study’s inquiry into this area prompts two other conclusions. First, 
it is essential that the private sector standard-setting body become more 
actively and intimately involved with the concerns of agencies of govern­
ment which may possess the power to override its standards in areas of 
their jurisdiction, demonstrating to them, in turn, that usefulness to in­
vestors must be the basic consideration in financial reporting. Secondly, 
in the long run, the present jurisdictional patchwork in the area of 
financial reporting ought to be reduced. One agency, the SEC, charged 
solely with protecting the interests of investors, should have the ultimate 
power over all financial reporting for the benefit of public investors. A 
step in that direction was taken last year with the introduction of legisla­
tion 16 to eliminate the existing exemptions in the Federal Securities Acts
16 See H.R. 12128, introduced December 8, 1971 by Congressman Harley Staggers 
of West Virginia. The Chairman of the ICC has stated publicly that he favors the 
changes which would be brought about by such legislation.
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for carriers regulated by the ICC. Even without legislation, progress is 
possible. For example, over many years banks and trust companies (which 
possess complete exemption from SEC rules regarding financial disclosure) 
reported to their shareholders in a manner at variance with generally 
accepted accounting principles. However, in July 1969, representatives 
of the SEC, the three Federal bank regulatory agencies, and the American 
Bankers Association agreed upon a form for bank income statements which 
followed in large measure the audit guide for banks published by the 
Institute the previous year.
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CHAPTER 7
Advantages and disadvantages 
of the present arrangements: 
possible alternatives
Two c e n t r a l  i s s u e s  confronted us, once the choice was made to keep 
the standard-setting process in the private sector. These were:
1. Should the responsibility for setting accounting standards continue to be 
exclusively the province of the AICPA or should that responsibility be 
shared with others?
2. Whoever bears the responsibility, should the work be done by a fairly 
large, volunteer, part-time group or by a smaller, full-time board?
These two issues can be considered separately although at several points, 
as on financing, they come together. We shall consider them in the above 
order.
Should the AICPA share responsibility for standard- 
setting with others?
The Accounting Principles Board, as was explained earlier, is a senior 
committee of the AICPA. It is responsible to the Council of the AICPA 
through the Board of Directors, and its members are appointed from the 
ranks of the AICPA by the President of the Institute with approval of the 
Board of Directors. It is thus an integral part of the largest organization of 
accountants in this country.
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There are advantages to the present arrangement. Under this arrange­
ment the accounting profession, in the fullest sense, is performing the self- 
regulatory function of establishing standards for the guidance of its mem­
bers in attesting to the fairness of financial statements. Members of the 
APB maintain their professional affiliations while devoting much of their 
time to the Board’s work; this fact might well be viewed as strengthening 
the connection between the profession and the work of the Board.
Moreover, the continuing contact that APB members have with their 
firms, companies, or universities protects them from the charge that they 
dwell in ivory towers. While the demands of Board membership make it 
virtually impossible for a practitioner member to have extensive client re­
sponsibilities, he continues, nevertheless, to have contact with his partners. 
He is not withdrawn from the problems of everyday professional life. Con­
sequently, he can be expected to bear in mind matters of practicability in 
the development of Board opinions.
From the Board’s inception, each of the eight largest public accounting 
firms has had one of its partners on the Board. Medium-sized and smaller 
firms have provided some outstanding men, including two of the Board’s 
five chairmen. CPAs from the industrial, financial, and academic worlds 
have also served on the APB, although only in small numbers. This repre­
sentative feature of the Board’s present organization has given it a broad 
constituency within the profession which has, in turn, generally helped to 
assure acceptance of its pronouncements without the need for cumbersome 
enforcement procedures. Whether the present Board can be said to be fully 
representative of the public interest in matters relating to financial reporting 
is perhaps more controversial. Despite the doubts which have been ex­
pressed on this score, we think there is prima facie reason for believing that 
members of a profession with many clients drawn from different sectors of 
society, with a sense of loyalty to their profession, will generally find it 
easier to adopt a public interest stance than men of equal integrity regu­
larly employed by private business.
As we have already pointed out, public accountants have a special posi­
tion and responsibility under the Federal Securities Acts. The audit of 
financial statements which they are required by law to perform, and the 
standards of independence which they are required by SEC regulation to 
meet, are designed to furnish added protection to the public in carrying out 
the statutory policy of full and fair disclosure. Such considerations have 
weighed heavily in our deliberations. They lead up to the conclusion that if 
the time has now come for a change in the composition of the Board, it is
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essential that at least a majority of the new Board’s members be public 
accountants. The tie between the Board and the public accounting pro­
fession must remain strong. Public accountants must see the new Board as 
fulfilling the essential duty of their profession to establish and improve the 
standards by which their activity advances the public interest. Such a duty 
has long been regarded as the hallmark of a true profession.
Nonetheless, we believe that the work of the standard-setting body would 
be improved if a more direct share of responsibility were given to the three 
principal groups in the financial reporting community who, together with 
auditors, have a substantial concern with the setting of financial accounting 
standards. These three groups are: financial executives of corporations who 
prepare reports to their stockholders, financial analysts who distill essential 
facts and trends from available financial data for dissemination outside their 
own organizations, and accounting educators. (We do not include in this 
financial reporting community those who merely use financial information 
for their own purposes.) Not only are these groups concerned with the 
standard-setting process, but they include individuals possessed of skills and 
experience of a high order which could be useful to the standard-setting 
body.
To facilitate such broader participation in the standard-setting process, 
we would eliminate the present requirement that all members of the APB 
be members of the AICPA. As to three of the seven persons making up the 
new standard-setting body, we would remove the requirement (subsumed by 
membership in the AICPA) that they hold a CPA certificate. We believe 
that for a standard-setting body such as we have in mind, one which is not 
wholly within the structure of the AICPA, these two requirements would 
unnecessarily exclude persons in all three of the fields mentioned—financial 
executives, academics, and financial analysts— who are not CPAs, or who 
are not members of the Institute, but who could nonetheless make a sub­
stantial contribution to the work of the body. We note that if the one finan­
cial analyst now on the APB had not also been a CPA he would have been 
disqualified from serving. There are senior financial executives outside the 
ranks of the Institute and academics knowledgeable about accounting who 
are not CPAs. We also note that of the roughly 125,000 CPAs in this 
country, some 40,000 or almost one-third do not belong to the AICPA at 
the present time and so are presently not eligible for membership on the 
APB. Of course, the more than two-thirds who do belong include virtually 
all the partners of the leading firms in the practicing part of the profession.
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Many well-informed persons believe that financial executives of corpo­
rations should play no part in standard-setting. One member of the APB 
has put it to us that “there is an inherent conflict between their role as 
managers and the task of measuring their own performance. An analogy 
might be having the baseball batter calling the balls and strikes.”
To this argument there are several answers. First, the present Board 
already has two seats for business executives (though one is now occupied 
by a financial analyst), so that the principle which is being questioned has 
already been conceded— unless a distinction is to be drawn between those 
executives who belong to the AICPA and those who do not, a distinction 
which, as we have said, we think should not be perpetuated. But more 
fundamentally, we think the Board member quoted above invokes the wrong 
analogy, since the role of the Board is not that of enforcing standards, but 
of developing them. True, the baseball batter should not call the balls and 
strikes; but there is no reason why he should not have some say in develop­
ing the rules of the game.
Secondly, insofar as the objection to financial executives having a role 
in standard-setting rests upon apprehension of a conflict of interest, we 
believe that the full-time service on the Standards Board which we propose 
should be a sufficient answer. On such a board, the board member, for the 
time he serves on it, would have no other loyalty. He would be serving 
because of the contribution he could make to the board’s work, drawing 
upon the special perspective and expertise he has developed in the role of a 
financial executive.
An important objection which might be raised against our proposal to 
broaden the base of the standard-setting body concerns the problem of 
enforcement. Can the disciplinary machinery of the AICPA be used to 
enforce, as to its members, the pronouncements of a standard-setting body 
which is not a committee of the Institute? It is an essential part of our pro­
posals that the new Standards Board, and the Financial Accounting Foun­
dation on which it rests, shall have a separate identity of their own. But 
under our proposals, the AICPA is given a role in the establishment and 
maintenance of the Foundation sufficient to provide a strong continuing 
sense of participation in its work and thereby to insure that the support of 
the profession will not be seriously diminished. In these circumstances, it 
seems to us, the answer to the question posed above about the use of the 
Institute’s disciplinary machinery to enforce standards under the new regime 
can and will be yes.
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Should the board be part-time or full-time?
Whatever the composition of the board as regards the professional alle­
giances of its members, the choice between a part-time or a full-time body 
must still be made.
The virtues of a part-time board are implicit in what has already been 
said about the present arrangements. The members of the present Board, 
by continuing to be partners of their firms or, if not in practice, by continu­
ing to perform their other functions, are kept aware of the problems faced 
by their professional brethren. In most cases, their firms can provide re­
search support to complement that provided by the AICPA. The heavy 
cost of setting financial accounting standards is thus largely hidden. The 
relatively large number of persons who can be brought onto a part-time 
board bring a diversity of views greater than could be found in a smaller 
group. Perhaps most important, a large part-time board has a representa­
tive character, at least in relation to members of the AICPA. In theory, 
therefore, it has a ready-made constituency to look to for support.
We are impressed by these considerations. When the Board came into 
existence twelve years ago, the model which was used was probably right 
for the time. Though the APB’s predecessor, the Committee on Accounting 
Procedure, had been issuing accounting research bulletins since 1939, the 
idea of enforceable accounting standards was not firmly established. Now 
it is. The arguments for a smaller, full-time board are much more per­
suasive now than they would have been in 1959.
The major positive arguments for a full-time board are independence and 
efficiency. It is the doubts cast on the disinterestedness of a part-time board 
which trouble its critics the most. They assert that Board members having 
a continuing affiliation with their firms or companies must inevitably find 
their loyalties divided. It is difficult to assess the seriousness of the risk 
that clients exert pressure on Board members to vote one way or another 
on specific issues. In large firms, APB members can be more easily shielded 
from direct client contacts. Moreover, it has been argued that, to some 
extent at least, competing pressures from numerous clients serve to neu­
tralize each other. Yet doubts remain. Partner pressure rather than client 
pressure may well be a greater danger. The proponents of a part-time board 
must confront this dilemma. The more importance they attach to the con­
tinuing professional contacts of board members, the more difficult it is for 
them to argue that such men can maintain undivided loyalty to the board.
At all events, it is perhaps the appearance of nonindependence rather
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than its reality which poses the more significant problem. If there is a 
widely held supposition— even an erroneous one— that the present Board 
is too responsive to client or industry pressure, then its position is weakened. 
We see no way of avoiding this difficulty except through a full-time board.
Judged also on grounds of efficiency, the drawbacks of the large, part- 
time board are formidable. It takes a great deal of time for all members of 
a large body to make their views known. It is far from certain that the 
quality of group decisions is enhanced as the number of persons in the group 
increases, once it has grown beyond a modest size. There is no satisfactory 
way to measure the efficiency of groups of different sizes. We can only 
express our judgment, which is shared by many who talked with us, that the 
present Board is too large. It is worth recalling that when the Seidman 
Committee recommended a reduction in the size of the Board in 1965 from 
21 to 18 members, it expressed the view that “it may very well be that the 
Board will find that even further reduction in its size is desirable and pos­
sible, say to 15.” Our own proposals go much farther.
We might note, at this point, the controversy which surrounds the 
Board’s voting rule. The requirement of a two-thirds majority can be 
defended as ensuring relatively wide acceptability for the Board’s pro­
nouncements, an advantage which decisions taken by bare majority might 
not enjoy. Hence, the problem of enforcement has been minimized. The 
other side of this picture, as both critics and friends of the Board have 
pointed out, is that the two-thirds rule has led to compromise and may 
have caused the Board in some instances to sacrifice decisiveness and 
principle to acceptability. What seems to some to be a source of strength 
appears to others to be a defect.
We believe the greater merit lies with a larger-than-majority voting 
requirement in the case of the seven-man Standards Board which we pro­
pose. Other considerations may well apply in the case of a larger volun­
teer board, but we have not undertaken to make a recommendation on 
the point, in view of the nature of our proposals.
The APB itself is on record as having “a strong majority view” in favor 
of a full-time chairman.1 We believe that if all members of the APB 
were able to devote themselves fully to the work of the Board, a sub­
stantial gain in efficiency would result. Consideration of a problem could 
be more continuous, more concentrated. If time were needed for reflec­
1 Report of the APB’s Committee on Board Operations, November 24, 1970, to 
the Board of Directors of the AICPA.
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tion, a full-time board could still take time (as the Supreme Court does) 
consciously, and not because of the intrusion of other activities, as is the 
case with the present APB. Direction of the board’s staff and its sub­
committees could be more continuous. Finally, a full-time board could 
deal expeditiously with new problems of accounting as they emerge.
We therefore recommend a full-time board with seven members. Before 
describing our proposals in detail, it is appropriate here to explain why 
we think that such a board may enjoy the advantages which are claimed 
for the present Board (or one like it) by its proponents, while avoiding 
its shortcomings. By being full-time, the new Standards Board can give 
undivided attention to the business before it. It will not constantly lose 
momentum, as a part-time group must do. The diversity of views which 
enriches the present Board can be obtained through the relatively large 
advisory council which we propose, through the board’s subcommittees 
or task forces (which will not be confined to board members) and through 
public hearings and other contacts with the business world. Though with­
drawn from public practice or other nonboard activity, board members 
will serve limited terms so that there is no serious danger of their getting 
too far out of touch with “the real world.” Above all, they will have no 
ties except to the board and thus will be seen to have no private inter­
ests which might come between them and the public interest; in these 
circumstances, their disinterestedness should not be seriously questioned.
Should there be two boards dealing, respectively, with 
fundamentals of financial accounting and the 
application or interpretation of such fundamentals?
A proposal has been made to us by several highly experienced account­
ing firms and individuals that the work of the Board should be divided 
between two bodies— one concerned with basic concepts and standards, 
and the other devoted solely to the application of those standards in par­
ticular areas of accounting practice.
We have given this proposal careful consideration. One obvious analogy 
to support such a division of functions is that of the constitutional con­
vention, on the one hand, and the legislature, on the other. This analogy, 
and others which we have reviewed, are somewhat far afield from the 
subject at hand, but perhaps serve a purpose in analysis. The analogue 
of the constitutional convention might well be the Accounting Objectives 
Study Group. When its work is done, it will presumably go out of exist­
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ence, as does each constitutional convention. Hopefully, it will have pro­
vided a chart of objectives and basic concepts which will enable the day-to- 
day work of the board to be more firmly grounded than before.
On the practical side, it seems to us preferable that actual drafting of 
basic standards and consideration of their application and interpretation 
be in one set of hands. To divide this responsibility is to open up the 
possibility of conflict between the two bodies as to whether a particular 
question is one involving a basic standard, on the one hand, or its applica­
tion, on the other, and also as to whether an interpretation drafted by 
one body is consistent with the intentions of the other. The disadvantages 
of the two-tier system, which include its added complexity, seem to us 
to outweigh its advantages.
A thoughtful comment on this issue, with which we agree, was made 
by the present Chairman of the APB in his statement to the Study at its 
public hearing:
Some say that the top rule-making authority should limit itself to formulat­
ing broad principles and leave their implementation to a lesser group. One 
suggestion would require the senior group to approve pronouncements of 
the lower group. This sounds fine— but it won’t work. Under this system, 
broad pronouncements would need to be delayed until it became clear 
that their implementation was sound, practical and feasible. The Board 
has frequently gone down a wide path only to back away when it was 
realized that practice could not follow. Once the Board unanimously 
issued an Opinion embodying a very fine theoretical concept requiring 
allocation of the proceeds of convertible debentures between debt and con­
version features, only to rescind it when the Board found that it was 
impractical and, in some instances, produced bizarre results.
Should there be a separate appellate body?
Several commentators have urged upon us the possible need for some 
procedure for appeal from APB pronouncements. The issue has been 
raised both by companies and independent accountants wishing to adopt 
some reporting procedure at variance with a Board opinion. They could 
be satisfied, presumably, only by the establishment of an appellate body 
separate from the APB.
We found that those who call for a new appellate body are not all 
talking about the same thing. Some are looking for a means of modifying 
or repealing standards issued by the APB. To achieve this end, they would
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cause a proposed standard (which is certain to be less than satisfactory 
to some who would be affected by it) to go through two complete proc­
esses of review, modification, and adoption or rejection. It is obvious 
that this would impose serious delays on the process of improving finan­
cial accounting. Moreover, it would necessarily require substantial duplica­
tion of effort. We question the wisdom of such a procedure.
Those who do not like a standard promulgated by the APB have the 
right to press for its reconsideration. Several of the APB’s opinions have 
revised earlier opinions in the light of changed circumstances or changed 
views. We endorse the continuance of that procedure. Continuous re­
view of its past pronouncements is a proper function of the Standards 
Board itself. To create a separate appellate body for this purpose would 
introduce confusion and uncertainty into the system.
The need for relief from a standard because of a company’s peculiar 
circumstances is a different ground on which it is asserted by some that 
an appellate body is necessary. As an example, a company might think 
that, because of special circumstances, rigorous adherence to APB Opin­
ion No. 15 might misrepresent its earnings per share. At the present 
time, the normal procedure would be to ask the Chief Accountant of 
the SEC to accept an accounting method not fully in accord with the 
Opinion. We have seen no evidence that this procedure is unsatisfactory, 
except in one respect. It has been urged that the SEC ought to publish 
information regarding those instances in which its staff has made im­
portant rulings of this character. We agree. If such information were more 
readily available, there would probably be less demand for an appeal 
procedure separate from or beyond the SEC.
Companies and unincorporated businesses which do not come under 
the jurisdiction of the SEC have a different problem. It is a matter 
between themselves and their auditors as to whether an accounting proce­
dure not fully in accordance with a standard issued by the APB or its 
successor is acceptable to the auditor. The AICPA’s Special Bulletin of 
October 1964, referred to at pages 41-42 above, provides that “ ‘sub­
stantial authoritative support’ can exist for accounting principles that dif­
fer from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board” and that when 
such a principle is applied in financial statements, “the reporting member 
must decide whether the principle has substantial authoritative support 
and is applicable in the circumstances.” Thus an escape hatch has been 
provided. The proposed new Rule 203 of the Institute’s Code of Profes­
sional Ethics, referred to at page 43 above, provides a different, and
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in our opinion a better, escape hatch. Moreover, the worst sanction which 
can be imposed on a business not required to report to the SEC is a 
qualified or adverse auditor’s opinion or a disclaimer of opinion on the 
financial statements.
We have not been convinced of the merits of an appellate body separate 
from the Standards Board itself, either for reporting companies or for 
those which do not report to the SEC. Our proposals, therefore, make no 
provision for such a body. This conclusion is in accord with the great 
weight of opinion expressed to us.
Should board opinions be officially adopted 
as rules of the SEC?
At least two able critics raised the question whether it would be an 
improvement over present procedures if opinions of the APB (or its 
successor) were to take effect only after they had been officially adopted 
as rules of the SEC. The Study gave careful consideration to this ques­
tion. There is at least one marked advantage to the suggested procedure. 
If it had been in effect, the unfortunate episode involving APB Opinion 
No. 2 (see page 25 above) could not have occurred.
Several possible disadvantages of the suggested procedure weighed 
heavily in the minds of members of the Study. It might well be ex­
tremely unwise on policy grounds for the Commission to permit an 
entirely separate group to draft its proposed rules in a given area. More­
over, many, if not most, of the opinions of the APB are ill-adapted to the 
standard format of administrative rules. Such opinions may provide for 
alternative treatment of a transaction or factual situation depending on 
the judgment of the accountant as to the applicability of a number of 
stated factors. Opinion No. 18 on accounting for long-term investments 
is an example. Administrative rules, on the contrary, must be as precise 
as possible. They are usually formulated with great care by lawyers. 
Understandably, such rules tend toward the creation of a rigid policy 
framework. Similar considerations apply to those pronouncements issued 
by the SEC which bear upon standards of financial accounting. It is 
partly for this reason, we suspect, that with rare exceptions such pro­
nouncements have been made by way of Accounting Series Releases or 
opinions of the Chief Accountant rather than by formal rules.
Even if formal rule-making were practicable in the area of financial 
accounting standards, however, we would be troubled by its potential im­
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pact. It can be assumed that if the APB or its successor should adopt 
an opinion after much study and debate, and thereafter that opinion 
should be published for comment by the Commission as a proposed rule, 
the outcome of the process could be quite different from the initial opinion. 
Repetition of all of the elements which went into the making of the 
original opinion would necessarily be involved, including preparation of 
an exposure draft, receipt of comments and alternative proposals, debate 
upon the form and substance of the opinion, decision, and final drafting. 
In this process, unless the subject matter is entirely noncontroversial, 
substantial change is probable. It is not change as such that concerns us, 
but the fact that when men of high ability and experience have labored 
on the form and substance of an opinion, only to see it revised or rejected 
by a separate authority, they will necessarily view their roles as down­
graded. We see a clear danger that this may lead to a lessening of com­
mitment by those leaders of the accounting profession who have, to date, 
been willing to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the service of the 
Board.
Another consequence of the suggested procedure which troubles us is 
the inevitable delay which it would interject into the standard-setting 
process.
On balance, therefore, the Study believes that it would be unwise, as 
it is unnecessary, to attempt to institute an arrangement by which opinions 
of the APB (or its successor) would be proposed for adoption as formal 
rules of the SEC. It should be borne in mind that the SEC presently has 
power to overrule the Board and to reverse or amend its opinions, as it 
did in the episode involving APB Opinion No. 2.
Should the board be established by law as an official 
self-regulatory agency?
Some have suggested to us that the APB, or its successor in the standard- 
setting field, should be realigned under an arrangement similar to that of 
the National Association of Securities Dealers ( “NASD” ) under Section 
15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (commonly referred to as 
the Maloney Act) as an official, governmentally sanctioned, self-regulatory 
agency.
There are several areas in which it could be argued that such a step 
might represent an improvement over present arrangements. However, 
none of these arguments has seemed to us to be particularly persuasive.
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First, it might be thought that a realignment of the functions of the 
APB under express statutory authority would decrease the risk of law­
suits by those aggrieved over a particular opinion. However, as previously 
discussed (see pages 43-46), we believe the risk of such suits is presently 
slight.
Secondly, one objective of such a realignment might be to enhance the 
authority of the opinions of whatever private body succeeded to the 
functions of the APB. As we have indicated, however, the opinions of 
the APB already possess a considerable degree of authority.
Thirdly, an official self-regulatory alignment would provide a means, 
beyond that available today, for disciplining accountants who fail to 
comply with the opinions of the standard-setting board. The statutory 
self-regulatory mechanism under which the NASD and the stock ex­
changes operate enables those agencies to make binding rules. The dis­
ciplinary power behind these rules is substantial and is founded on the 
severe economic consequences of suspension or expulsion from NASD or 
exchange membership. For an analogous disciplinary power to exist in 
the area of financial accounting, it would presumably be necessary to 
require all accountants practicing before the SEC to be members in good 
standing of a single organization (possibly the AICPA) and for that 
organization to have the power of suspension or expulsion. As is the 
case with the NASD, this disciplinary power would undoubtedly be ac­
companied by appellate review on the part of the SEC and, in general, 
by administrative and judicial supervision over the affairs of the Institute, 
or whatever new organization was set up for the purpose, of an order far 
more stringent than now applies. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Com­
mission would confine its attention to financial accounting standards. By 
analogy to the NASD example, supervision might well be extended to 
areas such as rules of ethics and statements of the Committee on Audit­
ing Procedure, with express power in the Commission to modify or rescind 
such opinions, rules, and statements at its discretion.
We are concerned by the potential impact on the accounting profession 
of such arrangements. They might affect adversely the development of 
that high sense of responsibility on the part of the financial reporting com­
munity which is vital to further improvement of financial accounting stand­
ards. Moreover, as has been noted, the gains to be obtained from such a 
realignment are open to question. On balance, we do not believe that 
establishment of an official self-regulatory agency for the purpose of formu­
lating financial accounting standards would be in the public interest.
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CHAPTER 8
The Study's recommendations
A Financial Accounting Foundation
We propose that a new foundation, to be called the Financial A c­
counting Foundation, be established, separate from all existing pro­
fessional bodies. It would be governed by a Board of Trustees com ­
posed of nine members, whose principal duty would be to appoint 
the members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and to 
raise the funds for its operation.1
The President of the AICPA would be, ex officio, a trustee of the 
Foundation. The other eight trustees would be appointed by the Board of 
Directors of the Institute for three-year terms. The initial terms would 
need to be staggered to assure continuity. Four of the appointed trustees 
would be CPAs in public practice. Two trustees would be financial execu­
tives, one a financial analyst, and one an accounting educator. These four 
trustees would be chosen, respectively, from short lists of names submitted 
by each of the following organizations: the Financial Executives Institute, 
the National Association of Accountants, the Financial Analysts Federa­
tion, and the American Accounting Association. The trustees would select 
their own chairman. Their actions would require a two-thirds majority of 
their total number, except as stated in (4) below.
The trustees would have four important duties:
1. To appoint the members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
1 See Appendix F, page 103, for a chart of the proposed organizational structure of 
the Foundation, the Standards Board, and the Advisory Council.
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2. To appoint the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, de­
scribed below.
3. To raise and allocate the funds required to support the new structure.
4. To review periodically the basic structure of the standard-setting or­
ganization, including the size, composition, and functions of the Stand­
ards Board and the Advisory Council referred to below. Changes in 
these arrangements, fundamental in nature, would require an affirma­
tive vote of eight trustees.
The trustees should not have any day-to-day operating responsibilities, 
and they would be expected to serve without remuneration. They would, 
however, be entitled to reimbursement for their expenses.
A Financial Accounting Standards Board
We propose that a Financial Accounting Standards Board be estab­
lished with seven members, all fully remunerated and serving full­
time. The function of the Standards Board would be to establish 
standards of financial accounting and reporting. The Board of 
Trustees would appoint members of the Standards Board and would  
also designate one of them to serve as chairman at the Trustees’ 
pleasure. During their terms of office, the members of the Standards 
Board would have no other affiliations. Four of them would be 
CPAs drawn from public practice. The other three would not need 
to hold a CPA certificate but should possess extensive experience in 
the financial reporting field.
It is implicit in this proposal that the Foundation and the new Standards 
Board, while they may depend on existing organizations for financial sup­
port, have a separate existence of their own. This would be marked by 
their having separate premises and staff. The financial implications of this 
separation are considered below.
But the separation has other implications. Even under the present ar­
rangements, care has to be taken to maintain a clear line between the 
areas in which the Accounting Principles Board and the AICPA’s Com­
mittee on Auditing Procedure have authority. Since they are both com­
mittees of the Institute, liaison between them has been easy. Only rarely 
have the formal pronouncements of the Committee on Auditing Procedure 
contained statements on accounting matters which needed to be cleared 
with the APB, and where they have, no serious difficulties have arisen.
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The Committee has retained jurisdiction over matters relating to the 
auditor’s report, since that is the end-product of the auditor’s procedures. 
We think it proper that the Institute’s Committee on Auditing Procedure 
should continue to be responsible both for audit procedures and the 
auditor’s report. The reconstituted Standards Board that we are proposing 
will not, or at least may not, be composed wholly of CPAs. Some of its 
members in the future may not have had direct experience in auditing 
and they should not be asked to pass judgment on matters concerning the 
auditor’s responsibilities. However, the Standards Board may have need 
to be concerned with the impact of its pronouncements on the position of 
the auditor, and it will be essential to maintain continuing close coopera­
tion between the Standards Board and the Institute’s Committee on Audit­
ing Procedure.
Another activity of Institute committees which interfaces with that of 
the APB is the preparation of audit guides. Their purpose is to supple­
ment the pronouncements of the APB and the Committee on Auditing Pro­
cedure with respect to a particular industry (such as Audits of Banks, 
issued in 1968) or an area of professional practice (such as Audits of 
Personal Financial Statements, issued in 1968). The preparation of each 
audit guide is the responsibility of a specially appointed committee working 
within the Auditing and Reporting Division (formerly the Technical Serv­
ices Division) of the Institute.
Under existing procedures, in order to avoid inconsistency between an 
audit guide and pronouncements of the APB and the Committee on Audit­
ing Procedure, the guide is informally reviewed by the two chairmen before 
it is publicly exposed. After incorporation of. the revisions resulting from 
the exposure, the guide must obtain the approval of at least two-thirds of 
the committee which prepared it. It is then resubmitted to the chairmen 
of the APB and the Committee on Auditing Procedure, whose approvals 
are necessary before it can be published. As far as the APB is concerned, 
this is in accordance with the general provision in the Board’s Charter 
that “the Board is responsible through its chairman for reviewing all state­
ments on financial accounting and reporting to be published by any com­
mittee of the Institute, in conformity with policies adopted by the Board 
of Directors with respect to senior committees.”
Under the new arrangements, audit guide committees should confine 
themselves to auditing questions. As a safeguard, the Institute should im­
pose upon audit guide committees a corresponding responsibility to clear 
an audit guide with the Financial Accounting Standards Board before it
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can be issued. It is essential that financial accounting standards be in only 
one set of hands—the Standards Board’s. Where the Institute has a com­
mittee working on an industry audit guide, it may be useful for the Stand­
ards Board to have a small task force, with industry experts on it, to 
maintain contact with the Institute committee, so that any difficulties can 
be resolved before they become acute.
The seven-man Standards Board that we are recommending seems to 
us to be small enough to be efficient and large enough to provide for a 
variety of views and backgrounds. If experience with a seven-man Stand­
ards Board suggests that a smaller or a larger board would be better, it 
could be changed under the power of review given to the Board of Trustees 
of the Foundation.
As for the qualifications of the members, we have intentionally pro­
vided that a majority of them would be CPAs drawn from public practice. 
We think it essential at this time, in the interests of enforcement of the new 
Standards Board’s pronouncements by the public accounting profession, 
that its composition should not be such as to endanger its acceptability to 
the profession. The other three members of the Standards Board should 
be well versed in the problems of financial reporting in order to be effective. 
To satisfy this requirement, a CPA certificate is not necessary, but neither 
is it a disqualification. Men and women of the caliber and with the qual­
ities we have in mind to fill these three seats on the Standards Board can 
be found among financial executives, financial analysts, academics, econo­
mists, and lawyers—but this list is not meant to be exhaustive.
Rather than bringing specially designated “public interest” representa­
tives onto the Board, we contemplate that it will be the obligation of all 
members of the Standards Board to represent the public interest. They 
would have no other function.
The full-time nature of the appointments to the new Standards Board is 
an essential element of our proposal. Of course, as in all such cases, this 
does not preclude writing, lecturing, or similar activities, but it does pre­
clude any continuing association between a Standards Board member and 
any firm or company. It also precludes any continuing association with 
any other institution unless this restriction is specifically waived by the 
Board of Trustees. An appropriate policy to prevent conflicts of interest 
arising from personal investments or other personal activity should be 
adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Foundation. There must be no 
conflict, real or apparent, between the member’s private interest and the 
public interest.
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To get the talent which these appointments call for, we think that the 
level of remuneration will have to be between $75,000 and $100,000 a 
year, with appropriate fringe benefits. We have heard much argument as 
to whether persons of the right caliber can be found to devote themselves 
exclusively to the Standards Board’s work at these salaries. We are confi­
dent that they can. Service on government commissions, though perhaps 
sometimes more prestigious, is much less well paid, yet able men can be 
found to serve. After a limited term on the Standards Board (see our next 
recommendation), a member might be expected to return to public prac­
tice, to industry, or to academic life with enhanced reputation and status. 
From time to time, there will be, members whose service on the Standards 
Board will be immediately followed by retirement. There will always be 
room on the Standards Board for such older men, but we do not contem­
plate that this will be the normal pattern of appointment.
M embers of the Standards Board would be appointed for a term of 
five years, with a possible renewal for a second term. A member 
would be rem oved from office before the end of his term only for 
permanent disability, malfeasance in office, or like causes. Appoint­
ments would be staggered, so that not more than two persons would 
retire in any one year.
With terms limited to five or, at most, ten years, there would seem to be 
no reason to fear that members of the Standards Board will become too 
far removed from everyday business life, nor that service on the Standards 
Board need jeopardize a man’s subsequent career. Indeed, as we have al­
ready suggested, it might be expected to enhance it.
In order to secure continuity and a smooth rotation, initial terms would 
have to vary, as follows:
one appointment for two years 
two appointments for three years 
one appointment for four years 
two appointments for five years 
one appointment for six years
With this plan, one or two members would retire or be reappointed at the 
end of each year after the second year.
An affirmative vote of five of the seven members of the Standards 
Board should be required to approve a standard before it can be issued.
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By requiring something more than a bare majority to authorize the 
issuance of a standard, the proposed voting rule would reduce the likelihood 
of controversial rulings which may not enjoy wide support outside the 
Standards Board. (See page 62 for further discussion of this point.)
When a standard is adopted by the requisite majority, it should be
published without dissents.
When a standard is published, its authority should not be weakened by 
the attachment to it of dissenting opinions. Accompanying the standard 
should be a full discussion of the arguments both for and against the con­
clusions of the Board. In addition, the Standards Board’s minutes should 
disclose the results of all votes that are taken, and should include dissenting 
opinions; these will be open for public inspection. It is not our wish to 
hide any dissent which may develop within the Standards Board but simply 
to insure that standards, when they are issued, are unequivocal. (For an 
expanded discussion of this matter, see pages 38-39 above.)
The Standards Board should, to the fullest extent practicable, carry
out its functions in public.
We expect the Standards Board to use every means available to it to in­
form the accounting profession and the business world about its activities, 
actual and prospective, through circulation of exposure drafts, public hear­
ings, discussions with special groups, and so on. A history for each of its 
pronouncements should be developed and made publicly available. This 
would include transcripts of hearings, minutes of meetings, copies of briefs 
and position papers submitted to the Standards Board, and any other 
relevant documentation.
We have already mentioned the need, as we see it, to explain more fully 
than has been done in the past why certain views were adopted and others 
were rejected. If the logic of the Standards Board’s position is clear as well 
as sound on a particular matter, this should enable it to win the necessary 
support. There is a sense in some quarters that the APB does not give 
sufficient attention to views put to it at public hearings, or as reactions to 
exposure drafts, if such views do not agree with the conclusions it has 
already reached. We do not agree with this criticism. However, in any case, 
it would lose much of its sting if the Standards Board devoted more space, 
perhaps in an appendix to a standard, to the grounds on which one position 
was upheld and another was rejected.
Though the Standards Board will hold public meetings, it must also have
74
the right to meet in executive session. Action taken by the Standards Board 
at any meeting will be part of the public record.
Interpretations, when necessary, should be issued with the full au­
thority of the Standards Board.
The Standards Board would no doubt find it necessary, as the APB has 
done, to provide interpretations of its standards from time to time when 
their application has been tested in practice and gaps or ambiguities have 
come to light. Work on an interpretation should be carried out by the 
Standards Board’s staff with the help, where necessary, of a small task 
force familiar with the topic in question. But the interpretation, when 
ready, should be issued by the Standards Board in its own name and with 
its full authority. Until such action is taken, we see no reason why the 
staff of the AICPA (or, for that matter, of any other body) should not feel 
free to offer unofficial advice to its members by way of interpretation of a 
standard. If, subsequently, an official interpretation is issued by the Stand­
ards Board, the unofficial interpretation would be deemed to have been 
superseded.
A Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council
We propose that the Board of Trustees of the Foundation establish a 
Financial Accounting Standards A dvisory Council, with approximately 
20 members, to work closely with the Standards Board in an advisory 
capacity. M embers of the Advisory Council would be appointed by 
the trustees to serve one-year terms which could be renewed inde­
finitely. They would be entitled to reimbursement of expenses, but no 
remuneration. They would be drawn from a variety of occupations, 
although not more than one-quarter of the members should be drawn 
from any single sphere of activity. The chairman of the Standards 
Board would also be, ex officio, chairman of the Advisory Council.
The Advisory Council would be the Standards Board’s permanent in­
strument for maintaining contact with the business and professional world. 
It is our intention that the Advisory Council be made up of persons con­
versant with and involved in the problems of communicating financial in­
formation, including knowledgeable users of such information. The only 
qualification for membership on the Advisory Council should be a capacity 
to make a contribution to the work of the Standards Board. In making 
appointments, the trustees of the Foundation would be expected to obtain
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suggestions from a number of organizations. The following list is illustra­
tive only:
American Accounting Association 
American Bar Association 
American Economic Association 
American Institute of CPAs 
Financial Analysts Federation 
Financial Executives Institute 
National Association of Accountants 
Securities Industry Association
In addition, names would be sought from the stock exchanges and from 
appropriate government agencies. We contemplate that staff members of 
the SEC might work on the Advisory Council to convey the concerns of the 
Commission and to help in setting priorities.
Members of the Advisory Council would be expected to serve without 
remuneration, but would be reimbursed for their expenses on request. They 
would, of course, continue to devote most of their time to their professional 
or business activities. Because the balance of skills and knowledge required 
on the Advisory Council will change from time to time, and perhaps fairly 
rapidly, appointments to it should be for one year at a time. The trustees 
of the Foundation can be left to use their judgment as to how long an 
individual should serve and we make no recommendation as to any limita­
tion on reappointments. However, we think it should be unusual for any 
person to serve for more than four years. We have recommended that the 
Advisory Council have approximately 20 members. There is no need to 
be more precise than this. The size of the Advisory Council, like its com­
position, might vary somewhat from time to time as the needs of the 
Standards Board for advice vary.
The functions of the Advisory Council would include providing advice 
to the Standards Board as to its priorities, helping it to set up task 
forces, reacting to proposed standards, and otherwise assisting the 
Standards Board when called upon to do so.
The Advisory Council we contemplate would have three main functions. 
First, it would assist the Standards Board from time to time in determining 
its priorities and drawing up its agenda. It should be the eyes and ears of 
the Standards Board in identifying, if possible before they become acute, 
the problems to which the Standards Board should turn its attention.
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The Advisory Council’s second function would be to help the Standards 
Board set up task forces to investigate and develop draft standards on 
matters on the Board’s agenda and to give advice on the selection of per­
sons to serve on such task forces (which would be comparable in function 
to the “subcommittees” of the present APB). The actual selection would 
be made by the chairman of the Standards Board. Members of the Advisory 
Council might themselves be selected to serve on task forces where the 
subject matter made this appropriate. When they did so, their membership 
on a task force would not terminate with termination of their membership 
on the Advisory Council.
No limitation need be placed on the persons who might be selected to 
serve on task forces or on the qualifications they should have. All that is 
necessary is that they should be able and willing to make a contribution to 
the solution of the problem under discusssion. The APB successfully used 
an actuary on the subcommittee considering the opinion on pension costs. 
An appraiser or an economist might be expected to have something to con­
tribute to a discussion of depreciation. Where accounting standards re­
lating to a specific industry are being considered, industry experts are 
indispensable. Knowledgeable users of financial statements might also 
serve a useful role.
The third function of the Advisory Council is to act as a sounding board 
and to express its views on proposed standards issuing from the Standards 
Board. The Standards Board will of course be listening to views put to it 
from many other quarters, but it can be expected to listen especially care­
fully to what the Advisory Council has to say.
It is to be expected that the Standards Board will have other matters on 
which it will seek the advice of the Advisory Council. It is of course not 
precluded from seeking advice in other quarters, nor is it bound to accept 
the Advisory Council’s advice when tendered. In particular, it may wish to 
set up task forces without consulting the Advisory Council, and must feel 
free to do so.
Financial accounting research
We urge that the Standards Board structure its research activity with its 
needs and objectives clearly in mind. It must first determine the type of 
research needed to complement the public testimony and position papers 
which the Board will receive in the course of its proceedings, as well as 
the abundance of published research prepared by academics, professional
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and business associations, and the like. In our view, research performed 
by the staff of the Standards Board should be analytical, empirical, evalua­
tive, and directed toward systematically dealing with the topics before the 
Board. For example, it should deal with such questions as:
What are the issues?
What are the alternatives?
What theoretical and practical support 
exists for alternative solutions?
What are the practical effects and 
implications of the alternatives?
We do not believe that the Board’s staff should be expected to conduct a 
broad, fundamental research program dealing with basic concepts on an 
ongoing basis, since we believe that this type of research is best left to those 
in the academic field.
Based on our review of the existing research program, we put forward 
the following recommendations in addition to those previously offered:
1. Projects should be rigorously controlled by the Standards Board and 
by its research director.
2. Projects should be carefully defined to assure that what needs to be 
researched is researched.
3. Full use should be made of task forces established with the cooperation 
of the Advisory Council.
4. Authors of research studies should be fully consulted in drafting pro­
posed standards and their related history.
Budget and funding
A budget of the projected costs of operation of the proposed Financial 
Accounting Foundation, the full-time Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, and the Advisory Council for which it will be responsible, is pre­
sented in Appendix G to this Report, page 105. It shows cash expendi­
tures which are likely to range between $2,500,000 and $3,000,000 per 
year. These figures explicitly include some of the costs presently borne 
by public accounting firms and other organizations which have personnel 
serving on the APB or engaged on research projects for it. However, it 
should not be supposed that such costs to firms and organizations will
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fall to zero under the new arrangements. There will still be the expense 
of preparing position papers for submission to the Standards Board. Firms 
and companies with men serving on the Board of Trustees and the Ad­
visory Council will still be put to the expense of supporting them during 
the time they devote to these duties.
The principal financial responsibility of the Foundation’s Board of Trust­
ees will be to raise the funds needed to cover the projected expenditures. 
Several offers of financial support have already been made as gestures 
of goodwill toward the kind of standard-setting organization which we 
are proposing. These offers encourage us to believe that the support of 
the standard-setting function which the public accounting profession has 
provided in the past will not be less readily forthcoming from it and 
from others in the future. There are several ways by which such support 
might be obtained.
One possibility, which many favor and which may initially be the most 
practical, is to continue to rely on voluntary contributions of firms, com­
panies, and individuals throughout the business world to support this 
work. An offer by Haskins & Sells to contribute $1,000,000 over a five- 
year period was made at our public hearing. The relatively long-term 
commitment implied by this generous offer is important if the Founda­
tion is to be firmly established.
The Accounting Research Association, membership in which is volun­
tary, provides an example of systematic fund-raising within the account­
ing profession. Presently limited to members of the AICPA, the ARA 
has a minimum scale of contributions, based (for firms) on the numbers 
of professional staff. The approximately $550,000 it raises each year 
covers the cost of operating the APB, including its research activities. Not 
all members of the AICPA belong to the Accounting Research Associa­
tion, and not all of them, therefore, bear the financial burden of the APB’s 
work.2
The new Standards Board will be able to call upon a wider constitu­
ency. In particular, it is to be hoped that the importance of its work 
may appeal to large business enterprises as a worthy object for support.
If voluntary contributions are thought to be too uncertain as a method 
of financing the Foundation, four other methods might be considered.
2 In 1971, the Accounting Research Association had a membership of about 3,000 
individuals and about 2,800 firms and sole practitioners.
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1. Contributions might be made to the Foundation by each of the pro­
fessional organizations which would nominate its trustees, as proposed on 
page 69 above. In view of the special position given to the AICPA 
by our proposals, extra weight might well be given to the Institute’s mem­
bership in any formula based on total membership to be agreed upon 
by the cooperating organizations.
To obtain some idea of the magnitude of the contribution per member 
that would be called for, it may be noted that at the end of 1971 the 
membership of the five organizations, including student members paying 
reduced subscriptions, was as follows:
2. An alternative form of this proposal would assess the contribution of 
each organization as a percentage of its dues income. The approximate 
dues income of the five organizations for their respective fiscal years 
ended in 1971 was:
These first two proposals have the advantage of freedom from possible 
legal difficulties. They confine negotiation to organizations which would 
participate in setting up the Foundation. Implementation would doubtless 
require an affirmative vote by the members of each of the cooperating 
bodies.
3. One way of spreading the burden broadly would be to have the 
AICPA levy a surcharge on member firms as a percentage of each firm’s 
audit fees. To protect the confidential character of information about 
firms’ income, such a levy could be handled by the Institute’s attorneys 
or some other neutral party, as certain contributions paid to the Account­
ing Research Association are now handled. The surcharge would nor­
mally be passed on to clients. We do not expect an arrangement of this 
kind to appeal strongly to Institute members.
American Accounting Association 
American Institute of CPAs 
Financial Analysts Federation 
Financial Executives Institute 
National Association of Accountants
14,000
85,000 
13,100
7,300
63,000
American Accounting Association 
American Institute of CPAs 
Financial Analysts Federation 
Financial Executives Institute 
National Association of Accountants
$ 164,000
4,400,000
235,000
750,000
2,820,000
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4. A surcharge might be levied by the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges, and possibly by other stock exchanges, on listed companies 
as a percentage of the value of their listed securities. This arrangement 
could work, of course, only with the cooperation of the exchanges. Un­
listed companies would escape having to make a contribution.
We doubt whether such an arrangement has much chance of adoption 
at the present time. Apart from possible legal difficulties, we think that 
the exchanges, even though well disposed towards the improvement of 
financial accounting standards, might regard a surcharge for this purpose 
as a dangerous precedent, to be followed by requests for charges for other 
worthy causes. Accordingly, we have no cause for optimism as to the 
viability of this proposal.
We hesitate to make a firm recommendation on the method or methods 
by which the Board of Trustees of the Foundation should raise the neces­
sary funds. Much will depend on how our proposals in general are 
received by the professional and business communities. The trustees will 
know the climate of opinion in which they will have to operate, while 
we can only conjecture. We therefore think it wise to leave to them the 
utmost freedom in a matter which is vital to the success of their work.
Transitional arrangements
In the transition from the APB to the Standards Board, opinions 
which have reached the exposure draft stage should be carried through 
to completion by the APB. Other matters on the A PB ’s agenda 
should be transferred to the Standards Board.
Once the new Foundation, the Standards Board, and the Advisory 
Council have been set up, there will have to be an orderly transfer of 
responsibility for establishing financial accounting standards to them from 
the APB. Experience of the somewhat similar transfer which took place 
from the Institute’s Committee on Accounting Procedure to the APB in 
1959 can be drawn on, although that was much simpler since both bodies 
were AICPA committees.
It would be unfortunate if the present momentum of the APB were to 
be lost in the transition, though it is inevitable that some will be. To 
minimize this loss, we recommend that the issuance of an exposure draft 
by the APB, which implies that it has reached an advanced stage in its 
consideration of a problem, should determine which matters it is to carry
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through to completion in the form of an opinion. Other matters on its 
agenda, together with the benefits of committee drafts, research studies 
and other inputs, should be turned over to the new Standards Board and 
its research staff.
We also think that there should be some carryover of personnel from 
the old organization to the new. Thus, the break will not be a clean 
one and the loss of momentum can to that extent be reduced.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusion
T h e  r e c e n t  p a s t  has been marked by contention approaching rancor 
among those outside the government who are involved in the financial re­
porting process. Such a state of affairs cannot continue. Either the con­
tending forces must find common ground for cooperation or the opportunity 
to cooperate will be lost. We have attempted to suggest such a common 
ground.
We have listened with great care to many people. The criticisms of the 
APB commanded our particular attention. We attempted a thorough anal­
ysis of the workings of the APB. As a result, we are satisfied that few, if 
any, other groups of part-time volunteers in business or the professions 
presently devote greater personal efforts to the tasks they have undertaken. 
Widespread changes have characterized the APB’s twelve-year span. 
Among other things, it has greatly improved its procedures for giving inter­
ested parties the opportunity to present their views and concerns. To an 
increasing extent, it has operated in an arena where conflicting views are 
strongly held and where contention is fueled by powerful interests. In the 
circumstances, one might say that the vigor of the criticism of its perform­
ance is as likely to signify that it is doing its job as that it is failing.
Nevertheless, we recommend substantial changes in the present structure 
for the establishment of financial accounting standards. We have attempted 
to give a reasoned explanation of how we arrived at such recommendations. 
Their acceptance would mark a new spirit of accommodation arising from 
a common need. The common need we see is for a bold new effort to in­
sure public confidence in the ways in which financial information is reported.
Public interest in business and in informative financial reporting by busi­
ness has expanded greatly since 1959 when the Accounting Principles
83
Board came into being. At that time, the accounting profession recognized, 
in the words of the Special Committee on Research Program, a responsi­
bility “to narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency in practice.” 
Many accounting problems of long standing remain to be dealt with. New 
and extremely difficult problems are constantly arising in the wake of 
innovative business techniques. In our judgment, a major new effort to 
solve these problems is required. The accounting profession has a vital 
stake in this effort. So has enlightened business management.
As our Report indicates, we believe that much can be gained from 
greater involvement on the part of financial executives, financial analysts, 
and accounting educators in the standard-setting process. We have turned 
to four organizations of national scope and importance, the Financial 
Executives Institute, the National Association of Accountants, the Financial 
Analysts Federation, and the American Accounting Association, to aid in 
the selection of trustees for the proposed Financial Accounting Foundation. 
We hope these organizations and their members will agree with two con­
clusions we reached after the most careful deliberation: namely, that it is 
essential for CPAs in public practice to continue to bear the laboring oar 
on the standard-setting Board, and that it is equally important to preserve 
the self-regulatory character of the standard-setting process through an 
organizational interlock between the new Foundation and the AICPA.
The tasks facing a full-time Standards Board would be formidable. Its 
maintenance would involve an out-of-pocket cost substantially greater than 
that of the present APB. However, acceptance of a challenge of this sort 
is in the American tradition. A practicing accountant who has been a 
leader of the profession told the Study Group that the CPA “assumes as 
his ultimate client the general public.” We do not minimize the difficulties 
attending such a responsibility. It requires the strongest possible under­
pinning. We hope that the sort of Standards Board we have recommended 
may be able to supply that underpinning.
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A P P E N D I C E S
Appendix A
Prospectus*
A study of how accounting principles should 
be established
T h e  m a i n  p u r p o s e  of the study is to find ways for the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants to improve its function of establishing 
accounting principles. The study should consider how the Institute’s 
standards-setting role can be made more responsive to the needs of those 
who rely on financial statements.
The study should examine the organization and operation of the Ac­
counting Principles Board and determine what changes are necessary to 
attain better results faster. This will involve study, for example, of all the 
many changes that have been suggested, ranging from minor procedural 
suggestions to complete replacement of the part-time volunteer Board by 
a full-time paid Board with a court-like appeal mechanism. It will also 
involve consideration of entirely new approaches.
The study should consider which elements in society should participate 
in the establishment of accounting principles and how that participation 
can be best achieved. But of even greater concern to the study should be 
the public interest. The function of setting accounting principles import­
antly affects the public, and therefore the body performing the function 
should be responsible to the public.
The study should make recommendations as to the size and composition 
of the body that establishes accounting principles. The study should also 
consider major operating procedures for communicating with the public, 
for dealing with the SEC and other regulatory agencies, for maintaining an 
early warning system on developing problems, and for interpreting pro-
* Issued by the AICPA to the Study.
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nouncements and answering questions. The study should consider the 
division of responsibility for accounting principles between the public sector 
and the private sector and how they interrelate. Specifically, the acceptance 
and enforcement of accounting principles should be considered.
The study should obtain the views of as many interested parties as pos­
sible and should make sure that views are obtained which are representative 
of all segments of our society. One or more public hearings should be held. 
A public record should be maintained of significant proceedings of the 
study and of comments received from interested parties in order that back­
ground information will be available to everyone. The conclusions of the 
study should be explained in the light of the entire public record.
Major attention should be devoted to research needs and methodology.
The study should report its conclusions to the Board of Directors as soon 
as possible.
March 29, 1971
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Appendix B
1. Organizations which assisted the Study:
Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA
American Accounting Association
American Bar Association
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
American Stock Exchange
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Arthur Young & Company 
Caterpillar Tractor Co.
Central National Insurance Group of Omaha
Civil Aeronautics Board
Committee on Auditing Procedure of the AICPA
Corporate Accountability Research Group
Cost Accounting Standards Board
CPA Associates
Ernst & Ernst
Federal Power Commission 
Financial Analysts Federation 
Financial Executives Institute 
General Accounting Office (United States)
Haskins & Sells
Hospital Financial Management Association 
Hurdman and Cranstoun, Penney & Co.
Independent Natural Gas Association of America 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath 
Louis Sternbach & Company 
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery 
Machinery and Allied Products Institute 
Main Lafrentz & Co.
National Association of Accountants 
National Association of Independent Insurers
National Society of Controllers & Financial Officers of Savings Institutions 
New York Stock Exchange 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Robert Morris Associates
Savings Associations Financial Executives
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Securities and Exchange Commission 
Securities Industry Association 
Touche Ross & Co.
Treasury Department of the United States 
TRW Inc.
United Aircraft Corporation
2. Individuals who assisted the Study in their individual capacities and 
not as members of a particular firm or organization:
Marshall S. Armstrong, CPA
Kenneth Axelson, CPA, Vice President and Director of Finance and Ad­
ministration, J. C. Penney & Co.
Professor Herbert K. Bell, Jr., CPA 
M. F. Blake, CPA
Professor Abraham J. Briloff, CPA
Edward P. Brunner, CPA, Vice President-Accounting, Monumental Life 
Insurance Company 
E. Leo Burton, CPA
Allan Craig, CPA, Director, Bureau of Accounts and Statistics, Civil Aero­
nautics Board 
Dean Sidney Davidson, CPA 
Professor Robert I. Dickey, CPA 
Dean James Don Edwards, CPA 
J. F. Forster, CPA, Chairman, Sperry Rand Corporation 
Professor George Gibbs, CPA 
Clifford V. Heimbucher, CPA 
Professor Charles T. Horngren, CPA 
David B. Isbell, Esquire
Herbert C. Knortz, CPA, Senior Vice President and Comptroller, Inter­
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporation 
Professor Homer Kripke 
Professor Fred Lang, CPA 
Professor Spencer J. Martin 
Professor Maurice Moonitz, CPA 
Professor Gerhard G. Mueller 
David Norr, CPA
Arthur Okun, former Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors 
Walter E. Schirmer, Chief Executive, Clark Equipment Company 
Charles Schultz, former Director, Bureau of the Budget 
Professor William G. Shenkir, CPA 
Honorable Ezra Solomon, Council of Economic Advisors 
Professor Robert T. Sprouse
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Marvin Stone, CPA 
James F. Strother, Esquire 
A. Carl Tietjen, CPA 
Professor Richard Vangermeersch
John V. van Pelt III, CPA, Vice President-Finance, Vulcan Materials 
Company
William L. Wearly, Chairman, Ingersoll-Rand Company 
Professor Stephen A. Zeff
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Appendix C
Study on Establishment of 
Accounting Principles
Notice of Public Hearing
General information
In April, 1971 Marshall Armstrong, President of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, announced the formation of a special 
committee to “consider how the AIC-PA’s standards-setting role can be 
made more responsive to the needs of those who rely on financial state­
ments.”
Members of the committee are:
J o h n  C. B i e g l e r , CPA, senior partner of Price Waterhouse & Co. 
A r n o l d  I. L e v i n e , CPA, national executive partner, management of 
J. K. Lasser & Co.
W a l l a c e  E. O l s o n , CPA, executive partner of Alexander Grant & 
Company.
T h o m a s  C. P r y o r , senior vice-president and chairman of the invest­
ment policy committee of White Weld & Co.
R o g e r  B. S m i t h , vice-president—finance, General Motors Corporation. 
D a v id  S o l o m o n s , FCA, professor and chairman of the accounting de­
partment, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
F r a n c is  M. W h e a t , attorney-at-law, Chairman.
In his charge to the committee, President Armstrong said:
The study should examine the organization and operation of the Account­
ing Principles Board and determine what changes are necessary to attain 
better results faster. This will involve study, for example, of all the many 
changes that have been suggested, ranging from minor procedural sugges-
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tions to complete replacement of the part-time volunteer Board by a full­
time Board with a court-like appeal mechanism. It will also involve con­
sideration of entirely new approaches.
The Committee is anxious to consider the views of all persons interested 
in this subject, and for this purpose, will hold a public hearing in accordance 
with the detailed particulars set forth below. All interested persons are 
invited.
Detailed information
Date: Wednesday and (if needed) Thursday, November 3-4, 1971.
Time: 10:00 a .m . to 5:00 p .m . each day.
Place: Offices of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
1700 Broadway at 53rd Street, (11th Floor), New York City.
Purpose: To provide an opportunity for the Study on Establishment of 
Accounting Principles to hear (either in writing, or both in writing and 
orally) from those who are interested in this subject and who wish to 
present views critical of, or in support of, the procedure whereby financial 
accounting standards are presently established.
Memorandum questions: A memorandum of the major questions with 
which the Study Committee is particularly concerned is attached hereto as 
an appendix.
Requests to participate: Individuals or groups wishing to participate 
should notify the Administrative Secretary of the Study Committee, 
Michael A. Pinto, CPA, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
666 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10019, in writing not later than Octo­
ber 1, 1971, indicating whether (a) they plan to submit a written statement 
and (b) they wish to make an oral presentation.
Written statements: The Study Committee strongly urges participants to 
provide the Committee with a written statement of their views. All such 
statements will be made a part of the public record of the hearing. Writ­
ten statements may be submitted without requesting time for oral state­
ments. All written statements will receive the careful attention of the 
Study Committee.
Written statements should be submitted on 8½" x  11" paper (25 
copies) by October 15. Copies of such statements will be available for 
inspection at the AICPA offices after October 20. The Study Committee
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cannot undertake to distribute copies among participants. However, the 
Committee’s Administrative Secretary will, on request, supply the names 
and addresses of those who have indicated an intention to participate. Par­
ticipants may, of course, bring extra copies of their statements to the 
hearing for distribution.
Oral presentations: It would be extremely helpful to the Study Commit­
tee to have a written statement in advance from any person or groups who 
desire to make an oral presentation at the hearing, and it urges that this 
be done. In general, oral presentations should be limited to summation or 
elaboration of such statement, or comment on statements (written or oral) 
of other participants. Oral presentation should not be used to read written 
statements into the record— it can be presumed that the Study Committee 
will previously have read them.
The Study Committee will allot time to each participant. The amount 
of time allotted will depend, at least in part, on the number of persons who 
request time for oral presentations and the extent of elaboration on the 
written statements, summation and rebuttal the committee believes will be 
helpful to it.
A stenographic record of the proceedings will be made. Transcripts will 
be made available to interested parties upon payment of a reasonable fee 
designed to cover stenographic and duplication costs.
Further information: All communications relating to the hearing should 
be addressed to the Administrative Secretary of the Committee:
Mr. Michael A. Pinto, CPA 
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 
666 Fifth Avenue 
New York, New York 10019
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles—  
memorandum of pertinent questions
1. Establishing accounting principles— scape of the task. What is meant 
by the term “accounting principles”? Would it be more accurate and useful 
to refer to “financial accounting and reporting standards”? Should the body 
with primary responsibility for formulating such standards limit itself to 
fundamentals, should it develop detailed standards, or should it undertake 
to do both?
95
2. Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting stand­
ards reside in a governmental body or a nongovernmental body? Should 
the SEC, or another government agency, take over the basic task? Or should 
it remain with a nongovernmental body, such as the Accounting Principles 
Board? If a nongovernmental body, what should be its relationship to the 
AICPA? To the SEC? What is the nature of its authority and by what 
means can its pronouncements be enforced?
3. Composition of a nongovernmental standards board. Who should 
serve on the board? Should they all be CPAs? Members of the AICPA? 
What is its optimum size? In lieu of the present volunteer board, would it 
be preferable if the Chairman or the Chairman and some of the members, 
or all of the members, were paid and served full-time? If so, what should 
be their terms of office? What needs to be done about staffing? How should 
the board be financed?
4. Methods of operation of a nongovernmental standards board. The
procedures of the Accounting Principles Board have evolved to the point 
where the Board now holds public hearings on subjects for proposed opin­
ions. Are these proceedings satisfactory? How could they be improved? 
By what vote of its members should a nongovernmental standards board 
act? Majority? Two-thirds? Other? What procedures would enable such 
a board to take swift action on developing problems? Is the present pro­
cedure for obtaining unofficial interpretations of APB Opinions satisfactory? 
If not, how should it be changed? Should there be an appeal procedure? 
To whom?
5. Accounting research support for a nongovernmental standards board.
What sort of research is necessary as a prelude to the establishing of finan­
cial accounting standards? Who should conduct it? What guidelines for 
research studies would improve their quality and shorten the time for their 
completion? How should accounting research be financed?
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Appendix D
Expenses of Accounting Research and APB 
Administration Divisions of AICPA
Year ended Accounting APB
August 31 Research Administration Total
1961 $ 142,270 $ 142,270
1962 170,675 170,675
1963 156,937 156,937
1964 140,032 140,032
1965 125,218 $ 25,1691 150,387
1966 142,198 80,778 222,976
1967 161,898 111,363 273,261
1968 181,955 142,766 324,721
1969 213,937 151,583 365,520
1970 234,977 257,118 492,095
1971 251,662 262,592 514,254
$1,921,759 $1,031,369 $2,953,128
1 The APB Administration Division was established on April 1 ,  1965. Con­
sequently, the fiscal year ended August 31, 1965 includes operations for 
five months.
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Appendix E
Progress of APB Projects That Resulted in 
an Opinion
APB Active Agenda Dates 
First
Committee substantively Opinion 
appointed discussed published
APB Opinion 
No. Title
1 New Depreciation
Guidelines and 
Rules
2 Accounting for the
“ Investment 
Credit”
3 The Statement of
Source and Ap­
plication of 
Funds
4 Amending APB
Opinion No. 2
5 Reporting of Leases
in Financial State­
ments of Lessee
6 Status of Account­
ing Research 
Bulletins
7 Accounting for
Leases in Fi­
nancial State­
ments of Lessor 4
8 Accounting for the
Cost of Pension 
Plans 8
9 Reporting the Re­
sults of Opera­
tions
Accounting
Research
Study
No. Date
2 1961
4 1962 mid-1962 
11/1964
1962 11/1964
1965 6/1965 
9/1965
10/1962 11/1962
10/1961 12/1962
6/1962 10/1963
3/1964 3/1964
10/1962 9/1964
11/1964 10/1965
1/1965 5/1966
2/1966 11/1966
12/1965 12/1966
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Accounting APB Active Agenda Dates
APB Opinion
Research
Study Committee
First
substantively Opinion
No. Title No. Date appointed discussed published
10 Omnibus Opin­
ion— 1966 12/1965 4/1966 12/1966
11 Accounting for 
Income Taxes 9 1966 12/1965 2/1966 12/1967
12 Omnibus Opin­
ion— 1967 1/1967 3/1967 12/1967
13 Amending Para­
graph 6 of APB 
Opinion No. 9, 
Application to 
Commercial 
Banks 1/1967 9/1968 3/1969
14 Accounting for 
Convertible Debt 
and Debt Issued 
with Stock Pur­
chase Warrants 8/1967 10/1967 3/1969
15 Earnings per 
Share 8/1967 10/1967 5/1969
16 Business Combina­
tions 5 1963 9/1968 1/1969 8/1970
17 Intangible Assets 10 1968 9/1968 1/1969 8/1970
18 The Equity 
Method of Ac­
counting for In­
vestments in 
Common Stock 7/1968 3/1969 3/1971
19 Reporting Changes 
in Financial 
Position 2 1961 11/1969 10/1970 3/1971
20 Accounting
Changes 3/1967 1/1968 7/1971
21 Interest on 
Receivables 
and Payables 11/1969 9/1970 8/1971
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Progress of APB Projects That Resulted in a Statement
APB Statement 
No. Title
1 Statement by the
Accounting Prin­
ciples Board 
(re ARS Nos.
1 and 3)
2 Disclosure of Sup­
plemental Finan­
cial Information 
by Diversified 
Companies
3 Financial State­
ments Restated 
for General 
Price-Level 
Changes
4 Basic Concepts
and Accounting 
Principles Under­
lying Financial 
Statements of 
Business 
Enterprises
APB Active Agenda Dates 
First
Committee substantively Statement 
appointed discussed published
1 1961
3 1962 4/1962 4/1962
9/1966 9/1966 9/1967
6 1963 6/1964 6/1969
1 1961
3 1962
7 1965 6/1965 9/1965 10/1970
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Accounting
Research
Study
No. Date
Projects on the APB Active Agenda at January 1, 1972
Accounting
Research
Study
Topic Actual Planned
Translating foreign operations 1972 10/1971 
Part 1— U.S. devaluation 
Part 2— general project
Income taxes— special areas 5/1969
Accounting policy 10/1968
Stock compensation 1/1971
Marketable securities 5/1969
Retirement of debt 9/1969 
Amending APB Opinions Nos.
5 and 7 2/1967
Extractive industries 1969 mid-1968 
Part 1— oil and gas industry 
Part 2— minerals
Noncash transactions 11/1969
Interim financial reporting 1/1968
Diversified companies 9/1966
Components of an enterprise 6/1965
Capitalization of interest 10/1971
Opinion No. 9— extraordinary items 12/1971
Self-insurance provisions 12/1971
102
APB
committee
appointed
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Appendix G
Financial Accounting Foundation 
Projected Net Expenses*
Salaries and related payroll costs:—  
Standards Board 
Professional staff:
Research, including consultants 
Administration 
Clerical staff
Fringe benefits, including payroll taxes
Total salaries and related payroll costs
Other expenses:—
Space, including rent, utilities and 
equipment 
Communication and distribution 
Meetings
Legal, accounting and miscellaneous 
Total other expenses 
Total expenses 
Estimated revenues from sale of publications 
Projected Net Expenses
Minimum
$ 725,000
500,000
400,000
250,000
250,000
2,125,000
200,000
100,000
75,000
75,000
450,000
2,575,000
250,000
$2,325,000
Maximum
$ 900,000
650,000
525,000
325,000
350,000
2,750,000
275,000
150,000
100,000 
100,000
625,000 
3,375,000
200,000 
$3,175,000
* The projected revenues and expenses include the activities of the full­
time Financial Accounting Standards Board, and the expenses, primarily 
for meetings, of the Foundation’s Board of Trustees and the Advisory 
Council.
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